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ABSTRACT
INTERNALIZATION OF EUROPEAN MINORITY NORMS:
    THE CASE OF GREECE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
           Didem Ekinci
M.A., Department of International Relations
       Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Gülgün Tuna
         September 2002
Coexistence of different ethnicities and cultural groups within the boundaries of
Europe have come to be the subject matter of serious arguments of minority-related
debates in the Continent to date, some of which have been translated into a series of
institutional arrangements. These arrangements, relatively insufficiently embraced in
earlier times, gave way to a broader yet compact arrangement by the European Union
which is open to signature also by non-member states. However, due to the lack of
value-free practices regarding minorities, certain “legally” European states such as
Greece seem to prefer to adhere to nationhood-oriented policies whereby one state,
one culture, one people is taken to be the norm. Given this mindset, the minorities in
Greece are seen by the Greek state as supposed to be outside the borders, letting
alone their peripheral locations. Although at a time when even non-member states
strive to partake in the related affairs of the Union, close examination reveals that
due to the strong and intrinsic existence of Greek nationalism encompassing its
specific ingredients of religion, language, the imported belief that Greece sets a
model civilization before all other nations, and similar Western intellect influence,
Greece has come to deny the existence of its minority groups which this thesis seeks
to examine in four parts. Based on such framework, it is seen with further elaboration
by this thesis that within an unlimited time span, Greek minority policies and those
of Europe display a discordant image, though the country is declared “European” by
both Europe and itself.
Keywords: Minorities in Greece, Greek minority policies, European minority norms,
Greek nationalism
iv
  ÖZET
          AVRUPA AZINLIK NORMLARININ BENİMSENMESİ:
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ İÇİNDE YUNANİSTAN ÖRNEĞİ
           Didem Ekinci
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Gülgün Tuna
Eylül 2002
Avrupa sınırları içinde farklı etnik ve kültürel grupların karşılıklı olarak
mevcudiyetleri, kıtada bir dizi kurumsal düzenlemenin oluşturulmasına yol açan
azınlık konulu tartışmaların özünü oluştura gelmiştir. Daha önceleri nispeten
yeterince benimsenememiş bu düzenlemeler ise üye olmayan ülkelerin imzasına da
açık olan, Birliğin daha geniş fakat daha kapsamlı bir düzenleme oluşturmasına
zemin hazırlamıştır. Ancak, temelinde değer yargıları bulunmayan azınlık
politikalarının oluşturulamamış olmasından dolayı, Yunanistan gibi bazı “hukuken”
Avrupalı devletler, tek ülke, tek kültür, tek halkın norm olarak alındığı ulus-temelli
politikalara bağlı kalmayı tercih eder görünmektedirler. Dolayısıyla, Yunanistan’da
azınlıklar, ikinci sınıf konumları bir yana, ülkenin sınırları dışında olmaları gerektiği
biçiminde algılanmaktadır. Günümüzde üye olmayan ülkelerin dahi AB’nin ilgili
düzenlemelerinde yer almaya gayret etmelerine rağmen, etraflı incelemeler
göstermektedir ki güçlü ve köklü Yunan milliyetçiliği ve içinde barındırdığı din ve
dil öğeleri ile, batıdan ihraç edilmiş olan, Yunanistan’ın bütün diğer uluslar için bir
örnek oluşturduğu inancı ve benzeri Batı düşüncesi etkileri nedeniyle Yunanistan, bu
tezde de dört bölümde ele alındığı üzere, azınlıkların inkarı politikasını benimseye
gelmiştir. Bu çerçevede, detaylarıyla bu tezde de görülmektedir ki, herhangi bir
zaman dilimi sınırlaması olmaksızın, gerek Yunanistan ve gerekse Avrupa tarafından
“Avrupalı” olarak tanımlanmasına rağmen, Yunanistan Avrupa’nın azınlık
politikalarına uyum sağlayan bir tablo sergilememektedir.
Keywords: Yunanistan’da azınlıklar, Yunan azınlık politikaları, Avrupa azınlık
normları, Yunan milliyetçiliği
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1 INTRODUCTION
Complex and politicized, the question of minorities is echoed present in the agenda
of European Union today. The issue indeed necessitates thorough analysis and
description, as the history and continuity of minority groups in Europe are observed
to differ in state- and self-descriptions, demographic settlements and figures; and
their underlying reasons.
Though one might assert that the national sentiment is not supposed to make itself be
felt in this simultaneously supranational, international and intergovernmental polity
as a requirement of integration philosophy, it indeed is traced as coming to fore as
further elaborated in this thesis, exemplifying the situation in Greece.
In general, a multifold collection of factors seem to operate before the relevant
policies and practices of Greece, which as a whole seem to serve to the preservation
of Greek nationalism. Religion and language being the two most influential and
dominant arguments regarding the issue, the remaining - and supplementing - ones
such as the “uniqueness of the Greek nation” with its universally accepted status
created by Romantic Western intellect, and the due presumption that Greece has set
the clock of civilization ticking can be argued as adding to the “accepted superiority”
of the Greek nation.
2Such a deep-rooted strand of thought has come to preserve its presence and is seen as
operating against the country’s minorities even today, though it should seem remote
to today’s realities.
Notwithstanding the arrangements provided in Europe to date; the European Union is
observed to present itself as a platform that is supposed to handle the question of
minorities within its boundaries; alongside with other domestic issues which have
become international. A tacit result is the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities of the Council of Europe, which is the most compact but
detailed arrangement to date in the Continent.
Though not perfect, close analysis would show that the Convention is flexible in
nature, in that, it is geared to protect and promote minority rights within member
states, emphasizing state sovereignty on the other hand, and grants the member states
the right to identify for themselves their own minorities.
Yet, Greece falls out from the signatory list due to an amalgam of intertwined range
of factors which are described in their length in the succeeding sections. The aim of
this thesis is thus to describe how European perceptions of minority have come to
evolve in the Continent’s history and; how Greece, accepted as a European country,
has manifest a discordant image in time as regards the issue.
The material gathered on related literature are observed to verify one another; as no
significant change is reported since times as early as Antiquity to present day.  As
extensive collection of sources approve, the basic assertion on Greece’s end remain
3unchanged: the Greek belief that Greece has been and is homogeneous in
demographic structure, and that there has not been any intermingling with
neighboring nations.
Within this framework, the first chapter provides a historical account on minorities in
the history of Europe, stretching as far back as to mythic times within space
limitations, exemplifying later minority arrangements and their nature; together with
contemporary ones, highlighting how and why these arrangements were formulated
and failed to prove successful in earlier times.
The second chapter is a preparatory connection to better understand its succeeding
section; in that, it goes through the evolution of nationalism in Greece initially traced
in city-state times; later during the Roman conquest, the Byzantium, the Ottoman
rule and finally in modern Greek state, and; would help comprehend that Greek
nationalism has in fact deeper roots than acknowledged.
The third chapter is devoted to description of minority groups and their situation in
Greece, supplemented by as many concrete examples as possible both from history
and recent developments; those contemporary minority groups being the Turks, the
Macedonians, the Albanians, the Vlahs, the Pomaks, the Roma and the Jews.
The fourth chapter constitutes a general analytical evaluation of the situation with its
emphasis on civil society and media in Greece as two negatively contributing factors
on the situation of minorities in Greece.
4In conclusion final remarks endorse in brief what has been inferred in preceding
sections and conclude that through more democratic involvement and social learning,
positive modifications might well be provided in the future on the issue.
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         CHAPTER I 
HISTORICAL BACKROUND OF MINORITIES AND MINORITY  
PROTECTION IN EUROPE 
 
1.1   EMERGENCE OF THE IDEA AND IDENTITY OF EUROPE 
               
 
           “Europe must be judged by how it treats its minorities...” 
               (Gerard Delanty, 1995:15) 
 
 
The cultural idea of Europe emerged as embedded in Christendom, which had 
become coterminous with the notion of the Occident, that essentially preceded the 
idea of Europe, nevertheless the idea in question had quite different a meaning for 
the ancients in terms of politics or culture, as it was more related to the domain of 
myths. That is, “Europa” was the name of a woman who had power of mystification 
in Greek myths.1 Seduced by Zeus, Europa, the Phoenician princess, left her 
homeland which is present day Lebanon and came to Crete where she later married 
the Cretan King and thus, it can be suggested that not being a highly differentiated 
concept, 
                                                 
1 see Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality  (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1995), pp.16-29, where the author cites Denys Hay inter alia on the origins of the idea of Europe and 
Greek myths on the issue. 
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“Europe” was not a Greek discovery, but a Phoenician one, since many Greek myths 
cite “Europe” as the sister of Asia and Libya (the ancient name of Africa).2 
 
In the reflections of many Greek intellectuals such as Aristotle, Plato or Heredotus, it 
appears that Asia and the remainder territory beyond Hellas were of little 
significance to the Greeks for whom everything non-Greek was simply “barbarian”, 
not in the present pejorative sense but denoting “non-Greekness”. With regard to 
geographical distinction, Toynbee3 argues that according to Hippocrates, the Sea of 
Azov was the boundary between Asia and Europe and for Heredotus, there was no 
clear distinction between Asia and Europe and the north of the Black Sea was named 
“Scythia” and Ptolemy used the term “Sarmatia” and distinguished between 
“Sarmatia Europea” and “Sarmatia Asiatica” with River Don separating them.4 
Toynbee further maintains that   the Greeks not always considered themselves as 
“Europeans” and what was significant was the presence of lesser opposition of 
Europe versus other realities, peoples and cultures than today.5  
 
Whatever viewpoint on the emergence of European identity might be adopted, it can 
be maintained that the early history of the idea of Europe reveals different 
approaches as to whether Europe is merely a geographical construct or a cultural 
political idea. It might also be suggested that with later presuppositions invented by 
western intellect asserting that Greece had set the clock of civilization ticking, the 
                                                 
2 Ibid. The author cites Sattler and Bernal as regards the later invention that was created to fabricate 
European cultural image whose roots lay in ancient Greece that bore no recognition of its roots in the 
Orient. 
3 Arnold Toynbee, Asia and Europe, Facts and Fantasies, In  A Study of History  (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1954), pp.708-729.  
4 Delanty, Inventing Europe, pp.16-29. Although the author does not offer any possible meaning of 
the term itself, it would be inferred that the word had a meaning related with “land” or “territory”. 
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early history of the idea of Europe entails a lesser degree of tension in terms of both 
identifying and treating the alien territories and cultures. However, as acknowledged, 
the political-cultural dualism with which the idea of Europe was linked was 
Christendom versus Islam in the aftermath of the early history of Europe6, and it can 
be asserted that by the eleventh century, the idea in question had well evolved from a 
mere geographical expression to a cultural issue. 
 
Viewed in retrospect, as Larkin asserts, by the fourth century The Christian Church 
had emerged as the official and sole religious identity of the Roman Empire 
manifesting considerable tolerance in terms of religion nevertheless, with the 
Crusades beginning in 1095, discrimination came to fore whereby Muslims and Jews 
were perceived as threats to the Church. To give but a couple of examples, the 
Fourth Lateran Council introduced a policy in 1215 restricting Jews into ghettos and 
regulating their dress. And, kings occasionally indulged in mass expulsion of Jews as 
King Edward of England did in 1290.7 The picture posed by the Roman Church in 
terms of intolerance took an intensified form in the Middle Ages wherein Europe 
introduced special tribunals to torture “heretic” elements of Jews, Muslims and 
eventually Protestants. Nevertheless, with the Protestant upheaval, emanating as 
Reformation in the sixteenth century followed by the Enlightenment in the 
eighteenth century, minority rights issues emerged within the scope of intellectual 
reasoning which essentially rejected oppression of minorities. Eventually, with the 
1789 French Revolution, and the consequent nineteenth century demonstrated more 
                                                                                                                                          
5 Toynbee, Asia and Europe, Facts and Fantasies, In  A Study of History , pp.711. 
6 Delanty, Inventing Europe, pp20-29. 
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concern on the issue8, with ethnic and linguistics minorities, which still occupies 
place in the Continent’s politics as a consequence of the permanent settlement in the 
European territories and due encounter between the peoples of Europe. 
 
 
1.2   DEFINING MINORITIES IN EUROPE 
 
As a ramification of the encounter between the settlers in Europe and the indigenous 
peoples, the decades-old reflections and formulations so as to find a proper definition 
for the term “minority” have invoked attention and diligence on the subject to date, 
however; a generally accepted definition failed to materialize due to the lack in terms 
of political will on the part of the states to take effective steps on the issue. As the 
issue is highly politicized, highlighting a couple of legal-political approaches to the 
term might offer tools to comprehend the word at the first stage along with various 
viewpoints on the question. 
 
An attempt by the United Nations in the twentieth century to define the term 
“minority” is seen in the 1985 meeting of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. In the deliberations, the definition put 
forward read: 
  
 
                                                                                                                                          
7 LaRae Larkin, The Legitimacy in International Law of the Detention and Internment of Aliens and 
Minorities in the Interest of National Security, Symposium Series, vol. 40 (Lewiston: The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1996), pp.33-35. 
8 Ibid. 
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A group of citizens of a state, constituting a numerical minority and 
in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the 
majority of the population, having a solidarity with one another, 
motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and 
whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in 
law.9 
 
 
The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly adopted Recommendation 1201 
(1993) for an additional protocol of the minority rights to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The proposal for 
this protocol defines minorities as follows: 
 
For the purpose of this Convention the expression “national 
minority refers to a group of persons in a state who 
a) reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof, 
b) maintain long standing, firm and lasting ties with that state, 
c)display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic 
characteristics, 
d) are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than 
rest of the population of that state, 
e) are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which 
constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their 
traditions, their religion or their language.10  
 
In contrast to UN and Council of Europe definitions, no agreement could be reached 
within the OSCE on the definition of minority. Yet, although at first sight, the results 
of this lack are not easily predictable, it is sometimes alleged that there is a silent, 
practical consensus in the OSCE that the concept “minority” concerns “a non-
dominant group which constitutes a numerical minority within a state.”11 
 
                                                 
9 United Nations E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, para. 181. 
10 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, EREC 1201. WP, 1403-1/2/93-17-E, pp.3. 
11 Kristin Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2000), pp.27-30 
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As regards individual interpretations, Panayi underscores the minorities in Europe as 
“...‘subcultures’ maintaining some or all of the behavioral characteristics that in 
some degree, set them off from society’s mainstream or modal culture”12, these 
behavioral characteristics being appearance, language and religion. Also, Eriksen, 
from an anthropological angle, defines minorities as such: “An ethnic minority can 
be defined as a group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population in a 
society, which is politically non-dominant and which reproduced as an ethnic 
category.”13 
 
Indeed, the definitions of minorities do point out the common aforementioned 
characteristics of minorities, though not matching with one another in their entirety. 
Still it would not be a fallacy to argue that these definitions and many others14  
address the issue at its core; as many minority settlements within Europe with their 
deep-rooted history manifest the mentioned common characteristics in due course of 
their coming into terms as they inhabited Europe. 
                                                 
12 Panikos Panayi, An Ethnic History of Europe Since 1945  (Essex: Longman, 2000), pp. 9. 
13 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives  (London: Pluto 
Press, 1993), pp. 121. For the definition of the term see Ivan Gyurcsik, “New Legal Ramifications of 
the Question of National Minorities-Introduction” in Minorities: The New Europe’s Old Issue, Ian M. 
Cuthbertson and Jane Leibowitz eds. (Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), pp.19-53; also see Roen 
Koch, “The International Community and Forms of Intervention in the Field of Minority Rights 
Protection”in ibid, pp.253-272; Cathie Lloyd, “National Approaches to Immigration and Minority 
Policies” in Ethnic Mobilization in a Multi-Cultural Europe, John Rex and Beatrice Drury eds. 
(Ipswich: Ipswich Book Co Ltd., 1994-1996), pp.69-77; see Sharon MacDonald, “Identity Complexes 
in Western Europe: Social Anthropological Perspectives” in Inside European Identities, Sharon 
MacDonald ed. (Province/Oxford: Berg, 1993), pp.1-26. For a detailed discussion of the term, see 
Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection.  See inter alia, Serge Moscovici 
“Innovation and Minority Influence” in Perspectives on Minority, Serge Moscovici, Gabriel Mugny,  
Eddy van Avermaet eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.9-48; Natan Lerner, 
“The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law” in Peoples and Minorities in International 
Law, Catherine Bröllmann et al. eds. (The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), pp.77-101; 
see also Patrick Thornberry, “Images of Autonomy and Individual and Collective Rights in 
International Instruments on the Rights of Minorities” in Autonomy: Applications and Implications, 
Markku Suksi ed. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp. 97-124; see idem, “International 
and European Standards on Minority Rights” in Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope for a 
Transnational Regime, Hugh Miall ed. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), pp.19. 
 11 
By way of conclusion, it can be inferred that there is no general agreement on a 
standard definition of  “minority”, at either the international or European level. If an 
optimistic view is to be developed regarding this lack or the disagreement  on the 
thorough components of minority definition, it can be argued that  only the 
discussion of disagreements might give way to improved insight on the width of the 
concept.15 
 
 
1.3   THE HISTORY OF MINORITY PROTECTION IN EUROPE 
 
The idea of creating a set of norms and values for treatment of minorities in Europe 
is not a new phenomenon.16 As Ryan argues, Capotorti is known to have traced the 
history of minority protection in Europe as far back as the 1606 Treaty of Vienna, 
which had provisions relating to the treatment of the Protestant minorities in 
Hungary.17 Several treaties then included provisions which were concerned with the 
protection of minorities.18 To cite a few, these include the 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia, the 1660 Treaty of Oliva, the 1678 Treat of Nijmegen, the 1763 Treaty 
                                                                                                                                          
14 see footnote 13 above. 
15 Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection, pp.30. 
16 Stephen Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (Vermont: Dartmouth, 1990), pp. 152-
153. 
17 see ibid., where Ryan cites Capotorti, the Special Rapporteur (along with Deschenes) of the UN 
Working Group on Minorities of UN Sub-Commission; see also the relevant document UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub2/384; see Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection, pp.18-25. 
18 Due to autocratic elements in the related period’s fashion of administration, the focal point in 
determining a minority type stood as religion. Yet, there evolved numerous  types of minorities in the 
course of history, concurrent with new types of states and new types of governing styles. For a 
thorough account of minority types, visit www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar, where Ted Robert Gurr of 
Maryland University provides a long list of them, though the examples for the categories do not 
always seem to match, most probably due to subjective interpretations on the issue; see also Panayi, 
An Ethnic History of Europe Since 1945, pp. 10-13. 
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of Paris, the    1815 Treaty of Vienna, the 1856 Treaty of Paris and 1878 Treaty of 
Berlin.19  
However, the minority protection regime implemented after the Great War stands 
different from the abovementioned treaties in view of several respects. First and 
foremost, the scope of the definition of a minority presented itself with a broader 
range than that of the hitherto cases; in that, linguistic and national minorities were 
added on to the religious minorities. Secondly, the guarantor role passed from 
sovereign states to the League of Nations. Thirdly, The League of Nations 
established a minorities section (though not as much refined as that of the UN today), 
which could for the first time provide permanent supervision of the treatment of 
minorities in the designated states. And finally, a judicial element was introduced to 
the process of protection by the role that was envisaged for the Permanent Court of 
International Justice.20   
 
In view of the League of Nations and United Nations systems of minority protection, 
the next section shall deal with the relevant formulations of minority treatment of 
each of these organizations. 
 
 
1.4   THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND MINORITY PROTECTION 
 
                                                 
19 see Patrick Thornberry, International Law and Rights of Minorities, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991), pp.25-35, for a detailed overview of the content of these treaties. 
20 see Gyurcsik, “Ramifications of the Question of National Minorities-Introduction”, pp.19-52; Ryan, 
Ethnic Conflict and International Relations; and Lerner, “The Evolution of Minority Rights in 
International Law”, pp.85. 
 13 
As Thornberry argues, Woodrow Wilson, the former president of the U.S.A, 
acknowledged the need for an arrangement of minority protection in the immediate 
aftermath of the Great War and took due role to voice the issue in an international 
forum: The League of Nations21. And as of 1923, when the system can be said to be 
operating fully, it envisaged seven legal stages concerning minorities which can be 
outlined as: 
a) right to petition the League if members of minorities felt their rights were not 
respected by governments, 
b) acceptance of the petition by the League minorities section, 
c) request by the League to the government concerned that they comment on the 
petition, 
d) passing the petition and comments by the concerned government to the League 
Council, 
e) designating an ad hoc committee to consider the documents, 
f) forwarding the recommendation of the ad hoc committee to the Council. The 
stages so far constituted the automatic procedure. 
g)Yet, this stage did not. At this stage it was upon the inclination of a Council 
member to get issue raised during a formal session.22 
 
Moreover, the League system was not intended for general application although it 
was designated as having “international” spirit; that is, it reflected European history 
and politics as it was based mainly on treaties signed following the Great War 
between European states. To give but few examples, treatment of minorities in 
                                                 
21 Thornberry, International Law and Rights of Minorities, pp.38. 
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Bulgaria was based mainly on the 1919 Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine. In similar 
fashion, treatment of minorities in Greece was arranged by the 1920 Treaty of 
Sevres.23  
 
However, in connection with the general malaise seen in the interbellum period, the 
world witnessed a retrogression of morals and politics, emergence of dictatorships 
harnessing extreme nationalism and erasing infant international cooperation, from 
which the minorities would also receive their share. Just as on many issues, the 
League system reflected unwillingness on resolution of minority conflicts. Yet, the 
League did occasionally present itself with success.24 To conclude, it can be 
maintained that as much of the deliberations and sessions were carried out in secret 
and no minutes were ever kept, a full analysis of the League of Nations’ involvement  
can be labeled as almost unreachable. 
 
 
1.5   THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS MINORITY REGIME 
 
By the time when attention was being focused on what form the new organization for 
the replacement of the League of Nations would take, discussions emerged about 
                                                                                                                                          
22 Walter Simons, International Public Law in Europe: The Evolution of International Public Law in 
Europe Since Grotius (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), pp. 96-118. 
23 For other treaties which served as basis for the purpose of preparing an arrangement of minority 
protection in The League of Nations, see ibid., pp. 41-42. 
24 The League for instance was able to stop the eviction of German farmers and upheld a complaint 
that Jewish entry to intellectual professions was being restricted. It was able to reverse an attempt by 
Romania to take over control of the local administration in the Magyar district of Szekler. Also, it 
succeeded in obtaining compensation for Russians on Mount Athos after the Greek Government 
expropriated an amount of land in the region; see Ryan, Ethnic Conflict and International Relations 
for further details on how and why a full support for the related regime would not materialize with 
examples of the time concerning (1919-1939). 
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whether a similar regime to protect minorities should be created in United Nations, 
however the UN’s attention relating to the issue came to fore as belated as 1978.25 
The UN conducted its related studies within the “Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
the Discrimination and Protection of Minorities” which was established in 1947.26 
Within this unit, slow progress was achieved and furthermore the UN Charter did in 
no shape or form of wording make a reference to the word “minority”.27 However, in 
1990 a notable change was observed wherein European states particularly Russia and 
Belarus manifest considerable interest in discussing the issue.28 
 
As a result of this inclination towards bringing the issue to open discussion, by 
December 1991, the UN Declaration regarding minority rights was approved and 
promulgated by the General Assembly on 18 December 1992 which read: 
 
 
...Democracy within nations requires respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, as set forth in the Charter. It requires, as 
well, a deeper understanding and respect for the rights of minorities 
and respect for the needs of the more vulnerable groups of society, 
especially women and children. (emphasis added)29 
                                                 
25 Alan Phillips, “Minority Rights: Some Governmental Approaches in Europe” in Scapegoats and 
Actors: The Exclusion and Integration of Minorities in Western and Eastern Europe, Daniele Joly ed. 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp.119. 
26 Theo van Boven, “A Runaway Train or a Re-orient Express? A Response to US Criticism of the 
UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities” in 
Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights Essays in Honor of Asbjörn Eide, Donna Gomien ed. 
(Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1993), pp.13. 
27 Charter of the UN and Statute of the International Court of Justice, Department of Public 
Information, (New York: UN, 1997), October 1997, 75M. 
28 see Phillips, “Minority Rights: Some Governmental Approaches in Europe”, where the author 
further argues that  effective NGO lobbying played a crucial role in creating such a momentum; see 
also idem, “Minority Rights in Europe”, in 
www.goecities.com/Athens/Delphi/6509/Warwick.htm_(November1995) 
29 Phillips, “Minority Rights: Some Governmental Approaches in Europe”; Phillips cites UN 
Secretary General, Agenda for Peace, September 1992, pp.46 and reviews several other article 
excerpts concerning the usage of the term “minority”, such as from the UN Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights when analyzing the employment of the word in retrospect, and Final Statement of the 
OSCE Human Dimension meeting in Copenhagen, (June 1990). 
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It can be argued that while the UN’s studies concerning minorities progressively 
benefited form a trend towards more transparency and openness which led to 
frequent discussions of the issue, the issue itself could not remain unpoliticized due 
to the presence of 26 expert members in the Sub-Commission, surrounded by 
approximately 100 government observers and even by a larger number of NGO 
representatives.30 
 
By way of conclusion, it can be posited that the Sub-Commission might take 
progressive steps provided that it embarks in an adjustment process. Indeed, as van 
Boven put it, “Certain steps have been taken in this direction”31 yet, more is needed 
when dealing with any possible gross problems as in the case of Bosnia. 
 
 
1.6   THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND MINORITY PROTECTION 
 
The Framework Convention for the Protection of the Council of Europe32 can be 
regarded as  a belated result of the changes after 1989 in Europe. As Gal asserts, the 
Framework Convention is a milestone in converting the political declarations and 
                                                 
30 see van Boven,  “A Runaway Train or a Re-orient Express? A Response to US Criticism of the UN 
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities”, pp.17-19. 
31 Ibid. 
32( Hereinafter referred to as the “Framework Convention”) The Framework Convention was adopted 
by the Committee of members of the Council of Europe on 10 November 1994. It was opened for 
signature on 1 February 1995 and it entered into force on 1 February 1998 following the required 
number of ratification which was 12. The number of signatures not followed by ratifications is 8, 
while the number of ratifications is 34 (data as of 22 November 2001). Among full members of the 
European Union, France is the only state which did not sign the Framework Convention. Greece 
signed it on 22 September 1997, however it did not ratify; see Kinga Gal, “The Council of Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and its Impact on Central and 
Eastern Europe”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, (Winter 2000), pp.2, in 
http://ecmi.de, European Center for Minority Issues. For a complete account of the current status of 
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intents into legal terms, thus becoming the first legally binding international 
instrument generally devoted to minority protection which shall be elaborated infra. 
 
However, on the way to understanding the urgent need to overcome divisions and 
conflicts in Europe, the Council of Europe indeed has a longer history dating back to 
its early days of establishment after World War II. Though seen in the context of 
human rights at the time, the Council’s mission was perceived primarily as “...to 
achieve a greater unity between its member states,.....on the basis of a specific 
political project: the commitment of member states and their peoples to the principles 
of a pluralist democracy, human rights and rule of law.”33  
 
In view of such an understanding, the project which the Council of Europe set about 
acknowledged the existence of diversity of peoples as part of Europe’s common 
experience; nevertheless the political structure of Europe until 1989 did not possess 
the means as to reach out also to the closed societies of Europe. However as of 1989, 
it began to gradually open up its structures and activities to all the states of the 
region. 
 
The main objective of the Council of Europe is seen in the “European Convention on 
Human Rights” of 1950, wherein the rights of minorities were also secured 
essentially by employing the term “everyone” and not expressions such as “people, 
                                                                                                                                          
the Convention, visit http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/searcsig.asp?NT=157&cm1&DF=; also see 
http://stars.coe.fr/gen/aintro/htm. 
33 Klaus Schumann, “The Role of the Council of Europe” in Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope 
for a Transnational Regime, Hugh Miall ed. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), pp.87. 
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public, citizen” and the like, particularly observed in Articles 9, 10, 11 Additional 
Protocol, Article 2.34  
Against this background, the European Commission for Democracy through law 
known as the “Venice Commission”, a unit consisting of eminent jurist and 
constitutional experts set up in 1989 under the aegis of the Council of Europe took 
the initiative to examine the proposal for a draft European Convention for the 
Protection of minorities. Nevertheless, after lengthy discussions and deliberations, 
the Council , in October 1993, in Vienna, agreed to call for a new framework 
convention in order to assure the protection of minorities, which would also be open 
for signature by non-member states. 
 
On the other hand, an idea for protection of regional or minority languages was 
proposed by the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, 
which drew the draft of the Charter of European Regional or Minority Languages 
which was subsequently adopted in June 1992 by the Committee of ministers.35  
 
As Henrard asserts, in examining the characteristics of the Charter, it is remarkable 
that “...the Charter does not grant any rights to speakers of certain (minority) 
languages or to certain linguistic groups but is focused on the languages themselves, 
                                                 
34 see ibid., pp.90 for these articles. 
35 The Charter entered into force on 1 March 1998; for further reading see Henrard, Devising an 
Adequate System of Minority Protection, pp.217; also see Maria Amor Martin Estébanez, “The 
Protection of National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities” in The European Union and 
Human Rights, Nanette A. Neuwahl and Allan Rosas eds. (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1995); on a thorough and compact examination of the educational, linguistic, cultural, regional 
development policies of the European Union such as SOCRATES (education pragram), LINGUA 
(language education program), LEADER II (rural development program) and possibilities to project 
these on minorities of different member-states. 
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and thus on a recognition, protection and promotion of multilingualism.”36 (brackets 
original). 
Secondly, the Charter envisages that the Contracting states can within a certain 
framework choose their obligations a la carte, thus leaving so much choice to 
member-states. As this naturally denotes each member-state can determine itself 
which languages are minority languages in their territory.37 
 
The contribution of the Charter to minority protection seems to be modulated and 
balanced in view of its flexibility as regards state’s choosing its options. In general, 
the Charter offers guidelines to member-states on the fashion to deal with the issues 
of accommodation of linguistic diversity and it confirms the importance of 
multiculturalism, including multilingualism.38 
 
Turning to the Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities, through close 
analysis, it can be seen that several articles of the Framework Convention take up 
human rights articles of the European Charter of Human Rights while introducing at 
times extra requirements for securing minority rights.39  
 
On the other hand, the Framework Convention does not define the subjects in its text. 
As such, certain states as Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Switzerland and 
                                                 
36 Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection, pp.215. 
37 see ibid., footnotes 345 and 346 in the study of the author where she addresses several criticisms to 
this approach and comments on relevant articles of 2, 3, 8, 12, 13 of the Charter, respectively. 
38 see Athanastasia Spiliopoulou-Akermark, Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law 
(London: Kluwer Law International, 1997), pp.331. 
39 see Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection, pp.211-212 for the relevant 
articles of 10, 13 and 15 of the Framework Convention whereby the author criticizes the wording of 
those articles in terms of their vagueness. To cite a few, these are, “parties concerned”, “as far as 
possible”, “within the framework of their (the states’) education system”. 
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Macedonia added their interpretations of the term, which consequently resulted in 
addition of declarations to the ratification of the Framework Convention and also the 
Convention stipulates that every signatory report on its implementations every five 
years.40 
  
As Gal argues, the number of laws, decrees or government programs dealing with 
minority rights stand impressive in Central and Eastern Europe.41 The reason behind 
such vigilance might be related with the fact that these states are inclined to integrate 
with Euro-Atlantic structures, thus they manifest due interest on the issue to prove 
their capacity of performance. However, it remains to be seen if the Central and 
Eastern European states shall automatically fulfill their commitments in this regard. 
Since the implementation of the undertakings is dependent on the political structure 
of governments and the will of incumbent political units in the states. In this respect, 
it is known that France and Greece as two full member states of the Union, did not 
ratify the Framework Convention, an indication of the absence of the will to 
internalize what is envisaged in these international arrangements. 
 
In general, there exist both positive and negative evaluations regarding the 
contribution of the Framework Convention on securing the rights of minorities, yet it 
would be maintained that the Framework Convention is the most impact but detailed 
European arrangement to date inter alia designated. 
 
                                                 
40 Gal, “The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and 
its Impact on Central and Eastern Europe”, pp. 2-3. 
41 Ibid. 
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The Council of Europe continues to be active in the field; in 1997 an Advisory 
Committee was designated to assist the Council of Ministers monitor agreements, 
and in 1998, an intergovernmental Committee of Experts was established to deal 
with minority-related issues (DH.MIN).42 
 
By way of conclusion, in contrast to arguments stating that the Council at best 
facilitates the work of those states which aim at ameliorating the treatment of 
minorities43, it may be seen that the Framework Convention represents a step 
forward in internalizing the European minority policies.  Besides, it may be argued 
that not the document itself, but the negative stances of full members as that of 
Greece by means of not ratifying the Convention complicates and heralds the 
achievement of a unified approach in Europe. 
 
 
1.7   OSCE AND PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS 
 
The OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) studies on 
minorities stem from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and Principle VII of the 
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States:  
 
The participating states on whose territory national minorities exist 
will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to 
equality before law, will afford them the full opportunity for the 
actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
                                                 
42 Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection, pp.214. 
43 Daniel T. Froats, “The Emergence and Selective Enforcement of International Minority-Rights 
Protections After the Cold War”, MacArthur Consortium Working Papers in Peace and Cooperation, 
(December 1996), pp.11, from Columbia International Affairs Online, http://www.ciaonet.org . 
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will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this 
sphere.44 
Yet, such a cautious wording covers also those states which maintain that there are 
no minorities in their territories - particularly Greece and France.45 As far as minority 
related documents are taken into account, from a positive viewpoint, it may be 
asserted that the Copenhagen Document of the OSCE is an important step towards an 
adequate international legal system for the protection of minorities. And although the 
OSCE documents and commitments are not legally binding on OSCE states, they are 
mere political declarations of intent, they do have a high de facto authority. In that, 
their effective influence as a source of inspiration is evidenced in the UN Declaration 
on Minorities.46 
 
The document sets important trends that contribute to the implementation of an 
effective minority protection, however, to reiterate as Dalton47 stresses, the wording 
and standards are cautiously flawed throughout the writing process causing 
vagueness. Thus, the degree to which the states consent to implement the principles 
and the standards of the OSCE on the related issue depends largely on their 
commitment and willingness to adjust their domestic law. 
 
To conclude, it may be inferred that being an actual part of Europe both in 
geographical and legal terms stipulate a certain internalization process. At a time 
when the formerly communist states of the Central and Eastern Europe are currently 
                                                 
44 Richard Dalton, “The Role of the CSCE” in Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope for a 
Transnational Regime, Hugh Miall ed. (London:Pinter Publishers, 1994), p.99. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection,, pp.206-207, citing A. Bloed, The 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 1993), pp.93-95. 
47 Dalton, “The Role of the CSCE”, pp.99-111. 
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implementing the aforementioned regulations so as to become members of the 
existing  
Euro-Atlantic structures and demand being treated as such, the stance of those states 
- particularly that of Greece - whose inclusion to such structures have already been 
welcome and deemed as ‘inseparable’ by Europe, it is noteworthy to analyze why 
and how the Greek example of unwillingness to adjust the domestic legislation as 
required by the highlighted regulations, particularly by the Framework Convention. 
The causal factors and the due effects of this reluctance in the Greek practice shall be 
examined in the next section to comprehend how a “legally” European state may 
present itself with standards far from being “European” with respect to minorities. 
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   CHAPTER II
EVOLUTION OF NATIONALISM IN GREECE AND
GREEK NATIONAL IDENTITY
If one exactly defined greek race
existed, how do we explain the diversity
of the Greek peoples?”
          (Jardé, 1996:3)
Just as extensive Greek literature shows, as early as the Classical Period, the Greeks
divided the world into two polarities by virtue of being Greek, and being non-Greek,
which was commensurate to being “barbarian”.1 Such exclusionary differentiation
which can be labeled as ethnocentricism  in due course of time exceeded linguistic
distinction and acquired a tone connoting a communal bond among the Greeks. In
this straightforward nature of ethnocentricism, it is remarkable that no ancient
civilization but Greeks “...invented a term which precisely and exclusively embraced
all who did not share their ethnicity”.2
                                                
1 Dirk T.D. Held, “Shaping Eurocentricism: The Uses of Greek Antiquity,” in Greeks and Barbarians,
John E. Coleman and Clark A. Walz eds. (Bethesda: CDL Press, 1997), pp. 256.
2 Held, ibid., quoting Edith Hall, Inventing the Barbarian, Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy
(Oxford:1989), pp.4. Held further analyzes the Greek ethnocentricism through comparing it with
Eurocentricism and maintains that unlike the former; the latter is complex and historically delimited,
yet still the two articulate collective identities. Held (pp. 257-258) holds the view that Eurocentricism
distinguishes itself from ethnocentricism through transcending local values.
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Coleman argues that “the ancient Greeks were thoroughly ‘ethnocentric’, for they
considered their culture superior to that of others and tended to look down upon and
despise foreigners”.3 Coleman goes on to maintain that this ethnocentricism had little
to do with the foreign elements themselves and much to do with the Greek
projections of what they viewed as (un)desirable in their way of living.4  The
stereotype  and the concept “barbarian” created by Greeks, with its entailments of
simple-mindedness, coarseness, brutality, slavishness and inferiority shaped Greek
attitudes in their actions with foreigners:
Hermippos in his Lives ascribes to Thales what others say of
Socrates. He used to say, they report, that he thanked Fortune for
three things: first I am a human and not a beast; second, that I am a
man and not a woman; and third, that I am a Greek and not a
barbarian.5
Indeed, Greeks are documented as less negative toward foreign peoples in periods
preceding the Persian Wars in 5th century BC than they later became. However,
Classical Period - late 5th and 4th centuries BC - reflects Greeks being at their most
“negative” as a consequence of Persian attack on their territories.6
                                                
3 Coleman, “Ancient Greek Ethnocentricism” in ibid, pp. 175. Quotation marks original.
4 Coleman, ibid. Viewing the issue in modern terms, the author notes that the word itself -barbarian-
subsequently came to play a major role in shaping modern European and American prejudices against
non-Western peoples.
5 Coleman, ibid., quoting Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, with an English
Translation by R. D. Hicks, 2 Volumes (Cambridge:1950), Loeb Classical Library, pp. 33, vol. 1.
Italics original.
6 Coleman, “Ancient Greek Ethnocentricism”, pp.176.
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At its outset, Greek life in the Greek peninsula grew on independent city states7
numbering in hundreds, sometimes joining in regional leagues, yet it is never
reported to have witnessed a single united state.
The land hosted a variety of peoples in it with many features common to all, yet with
many differences among them. “Soft Ionians and energetic Spartans, subtle
Athenians and thick-skulled Boetians”8 were in reality components of Greek peoples
yet even after the Macedonian conquest of the southern part of the Greek peninsula
for instance in the 4th century BC, these components were almost incessantly fighting
each other.9 Therefore, Coleman is right when he argues that the Greeks defined
themselves as a separate people not because they were affiliated to a single political
entity but on the basis of common language, belief, attitude and ancestry.10  If this is
to be coined the idea or the identity of “Greek-ness”, a relevant view by Holden
needs to be put forward, whereby he asserts that Greece was more central to “Greek-
ness” in the golden age of Classical Greece, 2500 years ago as a collection of
quarreling city-states.11
The constituents of the issue of Greekness may well be sought in the material
elements that make it up; these elements basically being language, religion, politics
and the like when analyzing Greekness and its implications on contact with
foreigners.
                                                
7 The Greek word for the term is “poleis” in singular and “polis” in plural.
8 Auguste François Jardé, The Formation of the Greek People, C. K. Ogden ed., M. R. Dobie trans.
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 3-5.
9 Jardé, ibid., and Coleman “Ancient Greek Ethnocentricism”, pp. 172.
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Although the primary distinction between the Greeks and the barbarians was based
on language, that is, the fact that Greeks spoke Greek, whereas  all others did not; it
is seen that they also used national names for specific peoples when they wanted:
Thracians, Lydians, Persians, Egyptians etc.12 In further detail, Jardé notes that there
were three basic dialects in Greek recognized by the Greeks: Ionic, Aolic and
Doric.13
It is argued that the word ‘barbaros’14 was onomatopoeic as noted by the geographer
Strabo who lived in the late 1st century BC and early 1st century AD; and it denoted
people who spoke unintelligibly that sounded like “bar-bar” to Greek ears.15 Jardé
draws a parallel account with Coleman when asserting that linguistic differences
were those which struck the Greeks most and rightly argues that such a puzzled
effect would be produced by any foreign language on those who do not know it.16
Through common languages which varied in dialects, the Greeks grew accustomed
to understanding and communicating one another. Yet, it is remarkable that
Pamphylian dialect was the only Hellenic tongue which was taken for a barbarian
language by the Greeks17. However, the similarities between the dialects were
striking enough for the Greeks to feel that they were speaking the same language
                                                                                                                                          
10 Coleman “Ancient Greek Ethnocentricism”, pp.177
11 David Holden, Greece Without Columns (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1972), pp. 23.
12 Coleman “Ancient Greek Ethnocentricism”, pp. 178.
13 Jardé, The Formation of the Greek People, pp.60. Jardé elaborates on the subject in the following
pages of his book and states that better equipped with comparative grammar, modern philologists
have distinguished a fourth group named Arcado-Cypriot.
14 ‘Barbaros’ is the Greek word for ‘barbarian’ in English. The plural form is ‘barbaroi’.
15 Coleman (pp. 178) suggests that ‘gibberish people’ would be a reasonable translation for the word.
16 Jardé, The Formation of the Greek People, pp. 230. Jardé also makes reference to Strabo as
Coleman does and adds that even the “neighing horses, birds singing and bubbling water talk
‘barbarian’; citing Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Sophocles and Eubulos, respectively for each sound.
17 Jardé, The Formation of the Greek People, pp. 285.
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whereas they never suspected the link between Greek and Indo-European tongues of
their neighbors: Thracians, Illyrians or Italians.18 Overall, linguistic unity stood as
the most important component of Hellenic19 peoples, yet it still was not the only
ground on which this common civilization depended; since it was the joint way the
Greek people represented themselves in an amalgam of language, religion/belief,
land or race which blended the Greek peoples into one Greek people.20  As the
Greeks spoke the common language, so they attributed themselves to common
beliefs, manners, an average treatment of foreigners, in brief; a shared mindset which
has its roots in Classical, Hellenic, Byzantine, Turkokratia periods and finally in the
independent Greek state of the date. Pinpointing Greek language as the foremost
determinant in Greek national consciousness as such, the remaining sections shall
elaborate on other constituents of this “mindset” which functioned as a merger of the
Hellenic peoples (=i Ellines).
                                                
18 Jardé, The Formation of the Greek People, pp. 286. See also Holden, Greece Without Columns, pp.
23. Holden adopts a modern angle to the issue and underscores the fact that there still is much
division on language, in that the current demotic language is derived from Classical Greek, but has
become different  from it, while the Greek state imposed an artificial adaptation of classical tongue
called “katharevousa” (=pure language). See also Andrew Robert Burn, The Pelican History of
Greece (London: Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 30-35, where Burn offers a compact overview on
peoples and languages and the coming of the Greeks in the peninsula before about 2500 BC. The
author also provides detailed accounts of linguistic facts such as adjectival terminations, roots, place
names and suggests that the Greek language belongs to the far-flung Indo-European family along with
the Celtic, Germanic, Slavonic and Italic (with Romance) language groups, even old Persian and
Sanskrit. Burn argues infra that this far-flung group of languages whose traces remain in the Aegean
and other areas must have been spread by migrations. See also Roger D. Woodard “Linguistic
Connections Between Greeks and non-Greeks” in Greeks and Barbarians, John E. Coleman ed., pp.
29-60.
19 The word is used interchangeably with the word “Greek” infra this chapter.
20 In similar vein with Jardé and Coleman, C. M. Woodhouse implicitly views the subject of the
history of Greece as a medley of peoples, races, land, language, religion and culture all together,
which would be inadequate and unreasonable if asserted in a divided fashion. See C. M. Woodhouse,
Modern Greece: A Short Story (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), pp. 11-13; Jardé, The Formation of
the Greek People, pp. 3-6 on a relevant overview; Holden, Greece Without Columns, pp.23; Paul
Cartledge, The Greeks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 1-18 and 35-62. For an
instructive account on the linguistic element of this amalgam, see Michael Herzfeld,  “National Spirit
or the Breath of Nature? The Expropriation of Folk Positivism in the Discourse of Greek
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2.1   THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT “BARBARIAN”: US vs. THEM
As suggested by Cartledge, ‘society’ is a problematic term in the study of antiquity,
since in Classical Greece, between about 500 BC and 300 BC, there was not a single
united society at all, though the author describes Greeks as having a homogeneous
culture, which is too literal to accept.21 In Cartledge’s account of views, Aristotle is
given as the figure of such an argument and it is stressed that “a northerner by origin,
Aristotle was born and brought up in Hellenic heartland where his father was a court
physician to a king of not entirely Greek, nor not yet wholly ‘barbarian’ Macedon.”22
Yet Aristotle passed most of his life in Greek south as a resident alien in Athens and
what is striking about him was that, at any rate, he thought and felt it was legitimate
and correct to talk about “Greeks” and what was “Greek”. Being both an outsider
and an insider, what Aristotle took to be common perceptions were the general Greek
attitudes and beliefs, the Greek mindset or mentality in his extensive writings.23
Aristotle might well constitute a renowned example of the common way that Greek
minds were organized, yet in general terms, it is acknowledged that scattered all
around the Mediterranean basin, the ordinary Greeks recognized themselves as
forming a division of the same group, the same family and it can be argued that this
feeling was strengthened by the very fact of their dispersion; living in rural
communities shut off from one another, which in fact caused the Greeks to preserve
their ties and maintain continuous commercial relations with the others due to the
                                                                                                                                          
Nationalism,” in Natural Histories of Discourse, Michael Silverstein and Greg Urban eds. (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 277-298.
21 Paul Cartledge, The Greeks, pp. 8-9.
22 Paul Cartledge, The Greeks, pp, 9.
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very weakness of each group; indeed, the Greeks may not have been able to make
extensive states, however, at least they preserved the notion of their common origin
and the feeling of Hellenic unity.24
This Hellenic unity is best defined by Heredotus when he said “Community of race,
community of language, community of manners - that was what in the ancients,
guaranteed Hellenic unity.”25
To bring in a geographical grounding to the subject matter, it has been noted that the
Greeks expanded their territory as of about 1000 BC, by colonizing the eastern
littoral of the Aegean Sea, in other words, the Western Coast of Asia Minor. In the
subsequent stages, Greek colonies reached also out to the northern Aegean, the Black
Sea, north Africa, Italy26 and the western Mediterranean27.
These colonial settlements may be traced as the means of close contact between the
Greeks and the local people including Eteocypriots in Cyprus, Carians, Lydians, and
Phrygians in Anatolia; Thracians, Skythians and Taurians in the northern Aegean
and the Black Sea; Libyans in Cyrenaica; Illyrians in the Adriatic; Sicels and Punic
people in Sicily; Etruscans and Italic peoples in Italy; and lastly Celts and Ligurians
                                                                                                                                          
23 Paul Cartledge, The Greeks, pp. 10-11.
24 Jardé, The Formation of the Greek People, pp. 229-230. See also Jeremy McInerney, Land and
Ethnicity in Ancient Phokis: The Folds of Parnassos (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), pp. 8-
39.
25 Providing both the original Greek and the quoted translation in his work, Jardé, ibid., maintains
quite dubious an approach as regards the race-related “community”, yet he assumes the other
components correct whilst elaborating the subject infra in part 4, chapter 1.
26 Later in history the southern part of Italy colonized by Greeks became known as “Magna Graecia”,
meaning “Great Greece”.
27 Coleman, “Ancient Greek Ethnocentricism”, pp. 179.
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in the western Mediterranean.28 The colonies in these regions generally preserved a
separate Greek identity; and relations with indigenous peoples varied, in that, in
some places, particularly where native rulers wished to enhance their status and
prosperity, Greeks may have been welcome as Coleman asserts.29 Nevertheless, to
reiterate, it is safe to maintain that Greeks preserved a position of control and
authority over the locals which embedded a mentality that these indigenous peoples
were inferior.
Such a perception manifests itself  in the Greek practice of slavery as the most
common means by which they came into close contact with foreigners. As Aristotle
and Xenophon mention, hardly any Greek household was without slaves, most of
whom were brought from Thrace and Phrygia.30 On the other hand, there were also
other foreigners who came to the Aegean as traders, artisans, mercenaries,
ambassadors, and consultants to various oracles; Athens hosting many of the foreign
merchants and artisans.31 Thus it can be inferred that, as a result of the ubiquitous
presence of slavery, the foreigners were of such a low status and were portrayed as
“barbarian” connoting an inferiority in character and/or in nature.32
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29 see J. B. Bury and Russel Meiggs, A History of Greece: To the Death of Alexander the Great
(London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 58-63; see also Coleman, ibid.
30 There had often been a close connection between Greek wine and foreign slaves as wine was one of
the most common of Greek exports and it was much sought after by barbarians. See Coleman
“Ancient Greek Ethnocentricism”, pp. 181, where he cites Cunliffe, Duchene and Finley on the wine
affair, wherein wine was alleged to have been traded in return for foreign slaves.
31 Athens consisted of “Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, ‘barbarians’ of all sorts” as Xenophon writes and
metics (=resident aliens) along with other foreigners acting as laborers, in commerce and trade;
activities all which the Greeks viewed as demeaning , since the dominant values in the Greek society
were those of the land aristocracy that gave priority to leisure and a life of the mind.
32 see Martin Bernal, “Race, Class, and Gender in the Formation of the Aryan Model of Greek
Origins,” in Nations, Identities, Culture, V. Y. Mudimbe ed. (London: Duke University Press, 1997),
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Last but not least, Carras also draws a parallel line in his argumentation on the Greek
identity and holds that for most Hellenes, it was life in a poleis which gave citizens
their sense of identity and privilege in relation to slaves or serfs.33
By conclusion, it can be argued as Cartledge that etymologically, “the ‘barbarians’
seemed to be those people who ‘babbled’ or ‘stammered’ for the Greeks”, but soon
Greeks conceived themselves superior to other peoples as laid out above and came
more and more to give the word a pejorative sense which it still possesses today:
Because the Greeks were “naturally” free and the barbarians naturally servile, it was
right and proper for the Greeks to rule barbarians, if only for their own good.
“Greeks (like the Britons of ‘Rule Britannia’) never, never shall be slaves, whereas
barbarians were naturally slavish and so tailormade for servitude”, and therefore, fear
of enslavement was the main motive for “othering” the barbarian for the majority of
ordinary free citizen Greeks.34
2.2   RELIGION UNITY
However far one goes in antiquity, it is argued that one never finds any religious
conception framed around monotheism in Greece.35 Moreover, it is asserted that the
Greeks had no one word equivalent to the English word “religion”, derived from
                                                
33 Costa Carras, “Identity,” in Encyclopedia of Greece and the Hellenic Tradition, available on
http://www.fitzroydearborn.com/encgreece.htm
34 see Cartledge, The Greeks, pp. 40-42.
35 Jardé, The Formation of the Greek People , pp. 235.
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Latin “ligare”, “to bind”, owing to the sense of binding felt by human beings in face
of supernatural phenomena, nor did they therefore distinguish any words related.36
Owing to a polytheistic approach, the world of Greeks was one full of gods - gods
which were bigger, stronger, more beautiful, eternally young, with feelings and
passions. Yet what should be stressed is the national character of Greek religion, that
is, as reported by Jardé, the citizen was recognized by his compulsory participation
in the city worship which was closed to foreigners. Thus it can be deduced that
religion and patriotism were linked, or even to take the assertion further; they were
the same thing.37
At its outset, each city had its gods and doubtlessly, the city conceived itself under
the special protection of one deity to whom it paid due worship; the “Poliad” deity,
its image symbolizing the city on coins, public seals, decrees and treaties. The feasts
of Poliad deity were national festivals once again where the stranger had no place.38
Just as local gods as Athene in Athens, there was a whole group of gods which had
become pan-Hellenic such as Apollo.39 In a neat illustration on the origins of Greeks’
gods, Heredotus is known to have boldly suggested that the names of almost all gods
came to Greece from Egypt, which later found new interpretations as that of Martin
Bernal in 1987 that Classical Greek culture as a whole was a direct transplant
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affected by Egyptian and Phoenician immigrants.40 However, interestingly enough,
Heredotus was inclined to explain that the Greeks and their culture were mere
children by comparison with the Egyptians who had been existing since time
immemorial, therefore, in a sense Herodotus wanted to view the issue both ways: the
gods both were and were not made in Greece, which gave the message that
barbarians were not equally despicable according to him.41 On the other hand, related
with perceiving religion as a cultural self-definition, Cartledge cites the Athenians’
reflections in Heredotus’ writings on what could be done in order to take revenge
from the Persian barbarians and their king Xerxes and on the impediments
preventing them from doing so. In doing so, they took into account and saw it
necessary to adhere to “the fact of being Greek” which had its own subdivisions: 1)
common blood and language, 2) common religious ritual sacrifice (theon hidrumata
koina kai thusiai), and 3) common way of life and outlook (ethea homotropa).42
Thus, again, religion is given due emphasis, encompassing an ethnic tone.
It can clearly be seen that community of religion in Greece was one of the strongest
bonds which could unite the Greeks. When Aristophanes would preach concord to
the Greek peoples, he reminded them that they “besprinkle their altars with the same
lustral water, like kinsmen.”43  Therefore, as his language and manners, the Greek
was distinguished by his religion from the barbarian. To a true-born Athenian,
foreign gods looked inconvenient and grotesque by the side of national gods, and one
has only to read just how Aristophanes had described the Thracian god Triballos in
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the Birds: “...that witless puppet, unable to pronounce a single Greek sentence
correctly, the most barbarian of all gods.”44
2.3    THE PERSIAN WARS
It has been argued that Greeks’ attitudes toward foreigners before and after the
Persian Wars of 490 and 480-479 BC reflect notable differences.45 As
aforementioned, the “barbarian” portrayal was not seen as occasionally as in the
preceding years of the Persian Wars, the best known example being the relatively
value-free wording in Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey, wherein the term “barbaroi” is
not employed. However, it is also counterargued that Homeric poems consistently
represented Greeks as superior to their enemies; to give but one example, the Trojans
and their allies have fewer heroes and their social and military organization lack in
cohesion in comparison with that of the Greeks in the Homeric poems.46 The ideals
of Greek society always tended to have a strong military component as war was
perceived as the natural result of human acquisitiveness47 and none of the people in
the colonized lands were able to successfully resist the Greeks by force of arms and
all came eventually to be dominated by the Greeks. Gradual elaboration of Greek
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46 Coleman, “Ancient Greek Ethnocentricism”, pp.187. The author also maintains that the Trojans’
speech was less assertive and warlike. Grounding his argument on the fact that the primarily Homeric
virtue is prowess in battle and the fame which results from it and that Trojan war was presented as a
total Greek victory, Coleman thinks that ancient listeners and readers of the Homeric poems
considered it as telling the glory of Greece and the inferiority of the Trojans and their allies, although
not employing the term “barbaroi”.
47 Coleman, “Ancient Greek Ethnocentricism”, pp.187.
36
mythic system and cultural manners reinforced Greeks’ feelings of superiority in
colonized lands.48
In general terms, the rise of Lydia in 8th century BC might have been the only reason
that affected the way the Greeks viewed foreigners as Coleman argues, since Lydia
was the first Asiatic state to cause Greeks to be subjugated. Also, the wealth of
Lydian rulers and their promotion of tyrannies in adjacent Greek cities might have
encouraged Greek stereotypes of western Asiatics. On the other hand, a factor in
Greek attitudes toward foreigners might well have been related to the earlier
geographical dichotomy of Europe and Asia as mentioned in the previous chapter.
Yet, this is not to say that Greeks had any conceptions of a “European Civilization”;
on the contrary “...they regarded all other dwellers in Europe as barbarians and
inferior to Greeks.”49 Therefore it is indeed interesting that later European peoples
have come to claim themselves heirs to the glories of Greek culture.
The negative stance in the Greek attitude toward foreigners comes as fostered after
the Persian Wars of the first quarter of the 5th century BC, and from then on,
particularly the state of Athens employed the term “barbaroi” and its derivatives.50
As a consequence the Athenian view of foreigners became predominant throughout
much of the Greek world, generally showing itself in the sphere of culture,
intellectual achievement, and even climate as Aristotle wrote in Politics:
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The Nations that live in cold regions and those of Europe are full of
spirit, but somewhat lacking in skill and intellect, for this reason,
while remaining relatively free, they lack political cohesion and the
ability to rule over their neighbors. On the other hand the Asiatic
nations have in their souls both intellect and skill, but are lacking in
spirit; so they remain enslaved and subject. The Hellenic race,
occupying a mid-point geographically, has a measure of both,
being both spirited and intelligent. Hence, it continues to be free, to
live under the best constitutions and, given a single constitution, to
be capable of ruling all other people.51
Greeks were not enthusiastic about the diversity of peoples as the chief speaker who
is an Athenian in Plato’s Laws sees in horror an intermingling of peoples and says
that if Athenians and Lacedaemonians had not joined against Persians they should
have by then a mixture of gene (races), as Coleman exemplifies: 1) Greek with
Greek, 2) Greek with barbarian, and 3) barbarian with Greek.52 Lastly, in general
terms, although Persians were the strongest opposition and real enemy of Greeks,
they are not represented in due frequency in Greek art as opposed to the domain of
politics.53
2.4 CITIZEN AND ALIEN
The very fact that the Greeks were conscious of being members of one body
translated itself into the perception on Greeks’ part to view aliens not only as
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foreigners but also as inferior beings, which Isocrates had interpreted as such:
“Between Greek and barbarian, there is no less difference than between man and
beast”.54  This Greek sentiment was in due course translated into deeds whereby the
Greeks invoked unwritten adjustments which were meant for regulating “Greek” life
and Greek mankind. The essential function of international law designated by the
Greeks was to regulate relations between citizen and alien, between which there was
an innate distinction; yet spite of the fact that Greek cities are reported to have
occasionally welcomed strangers, since from the very beginning, the stranger was
under the protection of gods, and of Zeus in particular; therefore he who turned away
the man sent by Zeus incurred the divine Curse.55
However, metics56 were bound with legal obligations of the city although they were
not citizens, in that they, for instance paid the Metic Tax, market dues which other
citizens were exempt. Their conditions varying from one poleis to another, the
general attitude was more or less the same. In cities where agriculture was the sole or
dominant occupation, it was challenging for a foreigner to find a place or to own
land.57 Nevertheless, even when Greek cities welcomed strangers, they did not go so
far as to treat them as citizens since they forbade intermarriage and the regulations
recognized as legitimate only those children whose father and mother were
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citizens.58 On this intra-city regulations and legal arrangements came other Hellenic
practices and traditions which were designed also in the larger spheres of
commercial law and laws of war. Reflection on other Hellenic customs once more
tells us that a common denominator could not be found as these regulations also were
formulae of Greek “superiority”.59
Later the Greek cities had been conquered by the Kingdom of Macedon and Greece
recognized the hegemony of King Philip. In fact the Greeks began to break loose
from their country more and more and from the mixture of all the Hellenic peoples, a
cosmopolitan population was being born. With the Macedonian conquest added on,
the movement of people and goods became more active. By the contact and the
mingling of the Greeks from all parts a common civilization was formed which in
fact was not a new thing as Poseidippos observed : “There are many cities but there
is only one Greece”60 and as a final remark it can be asserted that the Hellenic world
was sealed by opposition to the foreigner who was seen as an enemy, yet, the
civilization would take in more foreign elements as a result of the then ongoing
contacts.
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2.5  THE ROMAN INFLUENCE
In the period 146 BC-395 AD, Greece lived under  Roman rule; however, this did
not diminish the sense of a separate Hellenic identity.61 The Classical revivalists of
the 2nd century AD were proud to be culturally Hellenes though content to be part of
the Roman Empire; yet from the 3rd century onwards, the growth in religion and the
decline of cities led to changes in the description of identity. Therefore; by the 6th
and 7th centuries, “Hellenes” had already come to mean “pagans”, an object of scorn
for Christians. The loyalty focused on a single state, the Empire of the Romaioi
(=Romans) and the identity descriptions changed with continued distaste for the
barbarians. The barbarians who were effectively occupying the area of Greek cultural
and linguistic influence were portrayed more dangerous than ever since they were
distinguished  less by language  and more by their uncultured, destructive, and
“barbarous” behavior.62
2.6  THE BYZANTINE PERIOD
Discussion and contention on the Byzantine ethnic infusions which followed the
abovementioned Roman influence was first formulated by the German historian
Fallmerayer. According to him the ancient Greeks had disappeared completely and
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Greeks were merely descendants of Slavs and Albanians.63  Relevant historical
research is known to suggest that Slav tribes settled down in the Greek peninsula as
of 6th century which probably led to displacement of many Greeks. It would be too
straightforward to assume such an assertion, yet still, it would be reasonable to
accept that a certain degree of hellenization and assimilation of Slavs took place
during the reign of Justinian II (685-695; 705-711), ConstantineVI (780-797) and
Irene (797-802) as Vacalopoulos maintains:
The Christianization and hellenization of the Slavs in Macedonia,
Thrace and Epirus - at least in those parts of these provinces which
remained under Byzantine rule - were pressed on with vigor during the
first half of the ninth century, and it is interesting to follow the different
stages of the ecclesiastical reorganization of those regions after
Christianity had been utterly destroyed there. This meritorious activity
of the Byzantine Church reaped its best harvest under Patriarch
Photius.64
Indeed, the process of Hellenization was not brought about merely by religion, on the
contrary, the Slavs were simultaneously exposed to a variety of intellectual, political
and economic influences.
On the other hand various approaches are known to have been advanced as to when
the Albanians first appeared wherein the most extreme migrations have been traced
as early as the 8th century.65 Along with the Slavs and Albanians, the diffusion of
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Vlachs and later Turks was observed as components of the peoples on the Greek land
and in general terms, the remarkable consensus on the assertion that notable traits of
“nimbleness of perception, easy adaptibility, depth of feeling, fervent patriotism,
hatred of occupation by foreigners and passion for politics” went on to preserve its
essence in the Byzantine period.66  In the analysis of the Greek civilization during the
Roman rule, it is remarkable to see how survival and consolidation of Hellenism
was promoted by the Roman rule as Gregorovius underscores:
....The building of Constantinople in itself not only ensured the
perpetuation of the Greek nation but the preservation for posterity
of the incomparable treasures of Greek civilization. Without
Constantinople, indeed, Greece and the Peleponnese would have
been conquered and colonized by barbarous peoples. Without this
mighty fortified city and the protection which it offered it is
impossible to conceive of the conservation of Greek culture, or of
the Greek Church, or even of the existence of the Byzantine
Empire....67
With diverse beliefs, peoples and races, the Roman empire encompassed elements of
the ancient cultures of the East, the Hellenistic Empire, and the Roman polity,
however as Greek civilization was deeply rooted in the East, it was the Greek
speaking element which exerted the most profound and lasting influence upon the
Eastern Roman Empire. This profound influence may be coined as taken the form of
assimilation of foreign peoples mainly by the spread of Greek learning emanated
from the monasteries.68
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The assimilation is known to have extended throughout the entire geographical
extent of the Byzantine, in Asia Minor, continental Greece and the islands of the
Aegean, and the absorption of the diverse national groups occurred with the
dissemination of Greek language and Greek learning. Nevertheless from the 10th to
13th century, various forms of self-expression which were Greek arose within the
Byzantine world which led to an effect of growing consciousness of Greek national
identity.69  This consciousness was coupled by a spirit of popular resistance to the
foreign conquerors seen as of the Fourth Crusade (1204), the conquerors being
Bulgarian, Serbian, Turkish as well as Latin. It has been correctly posited that this
struggle for survival was grounded on a glorified past and, it constituted the principle
ingredient of the time.70
In line with such a stance, the writings of eminent historians are observed to be
replete with the name “Hellene”. To give but one example, Nicetas Choniates prayed
God “to keep our people intact” and strove to evoke in Greeks an awareness of the
glorious nature of their deeds: “How is it possible for history to recount the great
deeds of barbarians when history itself is the greatest achievement of Greeks?”71
Resistance to conquerors would in due course be heralded with rivalry between two
Greek states, Epirus and Nicaea, an accustomed fact as ancient Greek practices might
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remind, however, more important was still the mounting resistance movement by the
Greeks against the aliens.
The projection of this resistance can be distinguished as the germination of the
“Megali Idea” symbolized by various figures in Greek history72. The idea in question
was surrounded by an ambition both to reconquer Constantinople and ancient Greek
territories and to reunite all Greeks under one unity, free from foreign domination.
The anti-alien sentiment was harnessed in turn by the conquest of Constantinople in
1453 by the Turks and took the shape of a political program based on the
replacement of the Ottoman Empire by the Greek state, a restored Byzantine Empire,
with the Greek King at his head.73
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Thus, Greek national identity acquired a status which opposed them not only to the
antagonistic national entities in the Balkans and within Greece, but also to the
Ottoman “barbarians” in the future.74  It has been argued that one strong strand of
Early Modern Orthodox apocalypticism viewed the fall of Constantinople to the
Ottomans as being the direct result of divine intervention: “It was the will of God for
the City to fall to the Turks (=Itan thelima Theou i Poli na Tourkepsi).75   In other
words, the Ottoman conquest in fact was the punishment for Greeks, more neatly, for
their lapses from the true Orthodox faith and; the Greeks thought that “the City”
would be restored to them if they purified themselves and restored good faith.
However “Megali Idea was to remain just that - an idea”, which would ultimately
result in territorial losses, rather than gains for the Greeks.76
2.7   GREEK IDENTITY UNDER OTTOMAN RULE
Greek speaking populations lived under the Ottoman rule for almost four centuries
(1453-1830) and they were only one among many people composing the multiethnic
mosaic of the Sublime Porte: “Ethnic Greeks, Slavs, Bulgarians, Armenians,
Albanians, Jews and Levantines lived in a world in which the notion of nationalism,
national identity and their exclusive narratives were virtually absent.”77  In a similar
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fashion, the Greek Orthodox Church which had privileges under the Millet system
was not eager at all to promote any national particularism, yet its “ubiquitous
ecclesiastical apparatus had provided the only visible factor of a certain common
identity and differentiation vis-à-vis the dominating Muslims.”78
Ethnic Greeks, compared to other groups were privileged in an important respect, as
following the Byzantine practices, they carried out their ecclesiastical affairs in
Greek. Moreover, adding to language which was a factor in preserving a national
identity; in the 1821 War of Independence, Albanians, Vlahs and Slavs fought side
by side with Greeks against the Ottoman rule. However, relevant literature does not
attribute the movement to the Greeks and neighboring peoples of the Greek
territories, but to the Great Powers (Britain, Russia, France) who acted as the brokers
of Greece’s independence and its political life throughout the 19th century.79
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The recognition of Greek independence in 1830 was the result of the first attempted
European intervention in favor of a national liberation movement which had come to
being due to the universal significance of the Classic Hellenic past “which had
captured the romantic imagination of Enlightenment intellectuals...” and; in similar
fashion, it may well be noted that there grew an over-appreciation of an eternal
Greece evolved by European intellect who came to see Greece as the cradle of
civilization, democracy, philosophy, art, drama, etc. 80
Hence, already glorified by Renaissance, Greece was idealized by Europe as an
unprecedented success. In other words, it was not the Greeks, but the Europeans who
tended to take the origins of civilization to Hellas; which actually had a flattering
effect on the part of Greeks. These imported ideas and feelings were in turn coupled
with a similarly imported notion of the universal significance of their nation. Thus,
new Hellenism was offered a universally accepted status based on what Finlay called
“Homer, Plato & Co.”, which later opposed them not only to the Ottoman
“barbarians”, but also to all other national identities that would come to emerge in
the Balkans and in Greece proper .81
                                                
80 Constantine Tsoukalas, “European Modernity and Greek National Identity”, pp. 7.  For a compact
account of the Greek revolution in the 1820s, see Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of
the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), chap. 3,
passim.
81 Constantine Tsoukalas, “European Modernity and Greek National Identity”, pp. 9-10; and C. M.
Woodhouse, Modern Greece, pp.12 where he cites George Finlay, one of the widely known
philhellenes in the related literature. In a similar strand of thought, Tsoukalas (p. 13) mentions
philhellene poets such as Cavaphy, Elytis and also the Greek Nobel prize winner George Seferis; and
briefly argues that such figures were also effective in the universal articulation of the Hellenic glory
in their eloquence.
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In final remarks, it can be posited that the neither-nor82 portrayal of Greece’s
“unique” self-definition (neither western nor eastern, neither Catholic nor Protestant,
neither wholly pagan antiquity’s descendants nor orientals) still exists, yet it is a fact
that Europe has already welcome this Greek component into its visible unity, namely
the European Union, although Greece displays an in-between image and has not
clarified its identity.  These oppositions do not seem to have vanished from Greek
practices in the treatment of foreign elements and they indeed served for the
continuity and even for the worsening of the unfavorable situations of the foreign
elements in Greece to date. It seems that either this positive European intervention
was not projected on Greece in terms of minority policies or; though projected,
Greece did not display inclined behavior as to adopt what was reflected upon it. The
following sections elaborate on how and why this discordant image of Greece has
come to evolve, exemplifying the situations of Turks, Macedonians, Albanians,
Vlahs, Pomaks, the Roma and, the Jews in Greece grounding the issue on both the
legal framework laid out in the previous chapter and the historical account collected
in this section.
                                                
82 K. E. Fleming, in “Athens,  Constantinople, ‘Istambol’: Urban Paradigms and Nineteenth-Century
Greek National Identity”, pp. 19. See also Keith R. Legg and John M. Roberts, Modern Greece: A
Civilization on the Periphery (London: Westview Press, 1997), chap. 1, passim, for modern Greek
views on the issue; see James Pettifer, The Greeks (London: Viking, 1993), introduction; and George
A. Kourvetaris, Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1999), pp. 1-26. Another identity and nationhood analysis is also available in Yorgos A.
Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz, A Profile of Modern Greece: In Search of Identity (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), chap. 1, passim. See also Demetrios J. Constantelos, The Greeks: Their
Heritage and Its Value Today (Massachusetts: Hellenic College Press, 1996).
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   CHAPTER III
POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF GREECE WITH RESPECT TO
 ITS MINORITIES
3.  1  OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION
As posited in the previous sections in length, incorporation of the minority groups
into the structures constituting state and civil life in Greece manifest quite non-
integral a portrait due to the innate dichotomy between “us” and “them”. As
Triandafyllidou et al.1 state, this perception is exemplified by a neologism coined by
Sartzetakis, the former President of Greece, in a speech delivered in Greece in 1989;
the Greeks define themselves as “anadelphon”, which essentially denotes “a nation
deprived of brothers or allies”.
In line with the sense of the word, Triandafyllidou et al. further maintain that this
principle sets the foundations of the distinctiveness of Greekness; in view of such a
mindset, the “others” were supposed to be outside the internal structures or borders,
which incrementally gave way to a tendency to see the minorities through a negligent
                                                
1 A. Triandafyllidou et al., “New Greek Nationalism,” in Sociological Research Online, vol. 2, no. 1,
1997, available on http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/2/1/7.html
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and unfavorable perspective at best; and through exclusionary practices, assimilation
and expulsion at worst2; thus reflecting adherence to the idealized “we”, i. e., “the
nation”.3 As Milo correctly notes, the principles concerning the protection and the
rights of minorities have been integrated into the constitutions of Balkan countries,
yet this integration excludes that of Greece.4 Citing the renowned expert on the
related literature Adamantia Pollis, Milo writes that there is discrepancy between the
official stance towards the existence of minorities and the self identity of the people
involved.5 According to Article 3 of the Greek Constitution, the Orthodox religion is
the official religion of Greece, which renders the Greek Orthodox Church superior,
in parallel terms adding on to the isolation of minorities of different religions,
restriction of minority rights6 and related reluctance of recognizing minorities which
shall be elaborated in the present section.
Nevertheless, it might be worthwhile and equally interesting to cite the law draft
proposed in 9 February 2001 by Evangelos Venizelos, Greek Minister of Culture,
which was prepared to declare September 15 as the official day for commemorating
                                                
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. Triandafyllidou et al. incorporate the Greek case with the larger issue of Balkan nationalisms
wherein the nation is generally defined in ethnic terms and as a compact unit through the analysis of
the Greek - Macedonian relations. See also Pascalis Kitromilides, “ ‘Balkan Mentality’: History,
Legend, Imagination,” in Nations and Nationalism, vol. 2, no. 2, July 1996, pp. 163-191; and
Panayote Elias Dimitras, “Writing and Rewriting History in the Context of Balkan Nationalisms,” in
Southeast European Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, October 2000, pp. 41-59, where the author provides
analysis of Greek nationalism among other nationalisms with surveys conducted on neighboring
Balkan peoples in different countries. See Steven D. Nelson, “Comparing Aromanian, Bosniak,
Macedonian and Roma - Late or Failed - Nation-Building in the Balkans,” AIM Athens, 14 April
2001, available on http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data/200104/10414-002-trae-ath.htm.
4 Paskal Milo, “Constitutional Rights and Minorities in the Balkans: A Comparative Analysis,” in
Perceptions, vol. 2, no. 3, September - November 1997, available on
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/113/113-2.html.
5 Ibid. Milo quotes Adamantia Pollis, “Greek National Identity: Religious Minorities, Rights and
Norms,” in Journal of Modern Greek Studies, vol. 10, no. 2, October 1992, pp. 188.
6 Ibid.
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“the Genocide of the Greeks in Asia Minor by the Turks in 1922,”7 an attempt very
much like that debated in the French Parliament on the Armenian issue, yet; one
which Greece could not afford to accept, most probably due to revisiting any
possible costs of the action and the country’s own relevant record. Inclination to
preserve the profile it assumes to be posing in the EU and/or the Balkans might have
been the determinant in reverting from the issue for Greece, however; as following
sections articulate, not the issue of people “without”, but that of “within”, in
Greece’s contemporary politics, i. e., the minorities, requires to be drawn attention
to, rather than harnessing the dormant and ever-present feelings of hypernationalism.
3. 2 FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
NATIONAL MINORITIES AND GREECE
Greece signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
in Strasbourg on 22 September 1997, yet it has not ratified it.8 As per Article 28.1 of
the Greek Constitution, ratified international instruments take precedence over Greek
Domestic Law:
The generally recognized rules of international law, as well as
international conventions as of the time they are sanctioned by
statute and become operative according to their respective
condition, shall be an integral part of domestic Greek law and shall
prevail over any contrary provision of the law.9
                                                
7 “Greek Nationalism Proposal Fuels Balkan Nationalism,” Open Letter by Giorgios Nakratzas to
Evangelos Venizelos, Greek Minister of Culture, available on
http://www.florina.org/html/2001/2001_fueling_nationalism__html#
8 Martin Alexanderson, “Why the Framework Convention Should be Ratified,” in Mare Balticum,
vol. 3, August 1997, pp. 21-22, available on www.riga.lv/minelres/publicat/Alexan_1.htm.
9 Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM) and Minority Rights Group - Greece (MRG-G), “Report About
Compliance With the Principles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities,” available on www.greekhelsinki.gr/Minorities-of-Greece.html.
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However, just as the case, if international instruments are not ratified, the sole
provision in the Greek Constitution that operates concerning the rights of minorities
is Article 5.2:
All persons living within the Greek territory shall enjoy full
protection of their life, honor and liberty irrespective of nationality,
race or language and of religious or political beliefs. Exceptions
shall be permitted only in cases provided by International Law.10
Though the Greek Constitution does in no form or shape define “minority”, it
acknowledges the existence of only one among all, in religious character, which are
the Muslims of Thrace whose rights have been guaranteed the 1923 Treaty of
Lausanne. However, Greek laws use the terms “omogenis” and “allogenis” when
differentiating between ethnicity.11 It has been noted in the 1999 Report of Greek
Helsinki Monitor and Minority Rights Group - Greece that such “allogenis” Greek
citizens have been stripped of their citizenship if they settled abroad for future with
respect to Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code, which eventually came to be
abolished in 1998:
A person of non-Greek origin leaving Greece without the intention
of returning may be declared as having lost Greek nationality. This
also applies to a person of non-Greek ethnic origin born and
domiciled abroad. His minor children living abroad may be
declared as having lost Greek nationality if both their parents or the
surviving parent have lost the same. The Minister of the Interior
decides in these matters with the concurring opinion of the
National Council.12
                                                
10 Ibid.
11 The terms refer to “national and ethnic Greeks”, and “non-ethnic Greeks”, respectively. See ibid.,
Article 3.
12 see Lois Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece, A Helsinki Watch Report
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1990), pp. 11.
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The same report writes that while the bulk of 60,00013 people who lost their
citizenship under Article 19 between 1955 and 1998; omogenis people of Greek
origin who were citizens of other countries could swiftly acquire Greek citizenship.
These constitute but two examples of the Greek official attitudes and practices
among many observed to date14. Yet, official voices of pro-integration in the Greek
Parliament are also known to have raised questions regarding the ratification of the
Convention on minority issues. In 1999 when MP Maria Damanaki of the
Progressive Left Coalition requested that the Parliament discusses and ratifies the
Convention, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in his written answer declared that “The
ratification of the Framework Convention of Council of Europe is a matter of
time”15. However, the ratification of the Convention still remains to be seen while
many reports make reference to the necessity of the implementation of the related
international instruments by Greece.16
                                                
13 Figure provided by the then Minister of Interior Alekos Papadopoulos, “Avghi”, 24 January 1998.
14 see the “Report About Compliance With the Principles of the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities,” wherein the Greek Helsinki Monitor and Minority Rights Group -
Greece provide a neat observation. The report comprises of the first 18 Articles of the Convention and
Greece’s relevant practices and examples. See Appendix A.
15 “Parliamentary Question To the Minister of Foreign Affairs”, 18 October 1999, available on
http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pressrelease/daman-18-10-1999.html.
16 see “United States of America, Congressional Record, Proceedings And Debates of the 107th
Congress”, First Session, vol. 147, no. 0, Washington, 21 March 2001, “Celebrating Greek
Independence Day,” available on http://www.csce.gov/crs; United Nations, General Assembly,
Report A/51/542/Add.1, 7 November 1996, available on http://www.unhcr.ch/; United Nations,
Economic and Social Council, Report E/CN.4/1998/6, 22 January 1998, available on
http://www.unhcr.ch/; “Press Release by the Political Secretariat of Rainbow”, Florina-Lerin, 11
October 1999, available on http://www.florina.org. Also see “Press Release by 3 Minority Deputies
and 28 Minority organizations and NGOs on the Occasion of the Universal Day Against Racism (21
March)”, 19 March 1999, available on http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/pressrelease.htm; “Human Rights
Watch World Report 2002: Greece”, available on http://www.turkses.com/. For a more
comprehensive report, see “European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance: Second Report
on Greece”, available on http://www.turkses.com/; see also “Statement to the 2001 OSCE
Implementation Meeting Working Session on ‘Rule of Law, 18 September 2001, Greece: Unfair
Treatment of Migrants and Minorities” available on http://www.greekhelsinki.gr; and “U.S
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000: Greece”, available on
www.state.gov.
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3. 3  TURKS IN GREECE
The settlement and subsequent presence of the Turks in Western Thrace is reflected
as dating back to the 2nd century B.C17; while some related accounts note the first
Turkish traces in the region as 12th century18. In line with the latter, which is more
sound, Oran in his comprehensive writings marks the history of the Turks of Western
Thrace as beginning with the Ottoman conquest of the region in the 12th century;
more neatly illustrated as the 1363 conquest of Eastern Thrace and the subsequent
1364 conquest of Western Thrace.19
In geographic terms, Western Thrace is a narrow portion of land of 8,578 square
kilometers, stretching horizontally across the northern coasts of the Aegean,
surrounded by Bulgaria, Turkey and the Aegean Sea. Statistics reflect the overall
population of Turks in the region in 1922-23 as 129,120; yet the current figure is
110,00020. 80 % of the minority is traced to be localized in rural areas displaying a
high birth rate of 3%, which on the other hand was not reflected as an increase in the
number of population due to emigration to Turkey amounting to 250,000.21
Nevertheless, the figure for those Western Thrace Turks residing in Turkey
                                                
17 see File on the Problems of Turkey - The Western Thrace Turks Issue in Turkish - Greek Relations
(Ýstanbul: International Affairs Agency, 1992), pp. 9 and 11; and Murat Hatipoðlu, Yunanistan’da
Etnik Gruplar ve Azýnlýklar (Ethnic Groups and Minorities In Greece), (Ankara: Stratejik Araþtýrma
ve Etüdler Milli Komitesi, 1999), pp. 22.
18 see Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity, pp. 1
19 Baskýn Oran, Türk -Yunan Ýliþkilerinde Batý Trakya Sorunu (Western Thrace Question in
Turkish-Greek Relations), (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliði, 1986), pp. 8.
20 Turkish Minority in Greece - Greek Minority in Turkey, pp. 9. (Author’s name, date and place of
publication not printed, accessible in the library of Turkish Grand National Assembly).  For an
extensive account on Turkish existence in the Balkans and in Thrace, see Edward Stanford, Carte
Ethnologique de la Turquie D’Europe et de la Grece et Mémoire sur la Répartition Actuelle des Races
Dans la Péninsule Illyrique Aves Tableaux Statistiques, E. Dentu ed. (Paris: Palais-Royal, 1877).
21 Baskýn Oran, “Batý Trakya’daki Müslüman Türk Azýnlýðý,” in Türk-Yunan Uyuþmazlýðý, Semih
Vaner ed. (Ýstanbul: Metis, 1990), pp. 152.
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announced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Turkey is 2874 as January 200222;
consisting of those “heimatlos”23 or “iskat”24.
In general terms, the Turks of Western Thrace criticize and accuse the Greek state on
the grounds that it follows a discriminative policy denying the rights granted by
multilateral and bilateral agreements; and those granted by Greek citizenship.25 The
reaction by the Greek state against these allegations has been observed as objection
to the accusations, stressing that the Greek laws have not been and are not exercised
in discriminative manner; on the other hand, as the regards the accusations which
suggest that international agreements are not exercised, the Greek official stance is
known to have manifest a tendency to substantiate the issue on a counter-argument
as an answer: the argument that the Greek Orthodox population in Ýstanbul
decreased from 90,000 to 5,000; and that the Turkish government was responsible
for this26.
Through legal instruments and arrangements, it is seen that the first international
agreement on minority protection in Greece was the 1830 London Protocol which
declared Greece independent, with Great Britain, France and Russia acting as the
brokers of Greek political and international affairs. It guarantees the protection of the
Muslims in the territories of Greece.27 The second international agreement similar to
the London Protocol is the 1881 Ýstanbul Convention signed on the one hand by
                                                
22 Yeni Þafak, 7 January 2002.
23 “stateless”.
24 “deprived of Greek citizenship”.
25 Oran, “Batý Trakya’daki Müslüman Türk Azýnlýðý,” pp. 52.
26 Ibid.
27 Baskýn Oran, “Türk Dýþ Politikasý ve Batý Trakya,” in Türk Dýþ Politikasýnýn Analizi, Faruk
Sönmezoðlu ed. (Ýstanbul: Der Publications, 1998), pp. 311.
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France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Britain, Italy, Russia; and on the other hand by
the Ottoman Empire, again guaranteeing the rights of Muslim minorities in the
territories given to Greece.28  The third is known as the 1913 Athens Agreement
which was signed between Ottoman State and Greece and; the fourth is the Greek
Sevres signed on 10 August 1920.29 This last agreement is larger in scope in that it
undertakes to protect the rights of not only the Muslims but also all other minorities.
The fifth and the last international agreement is the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne,
specifically Article 45 and preceding Articles of 37 - 44 that it makes reference to.30
As Oran argues31, also the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and
Turkish Populations, signed concurrently in Lausanne, the 1926 Athens Agreement,
1930 and 1933 Ankara Agreements relate to the rights of the Turkish minority in
Western Thrace.32
Poulton argues33 that given the cited legal arrangements, Turkey has seen itself as
having the right to a say over the issues relating to the Turkish community more, for
example, than the case in Bulgaria where a solid amount of Turkish population also
exists, yet; where no such specific treaties do; and but less than the case in Cyprus
                                                
28 Oran, “Türk Dýþ Politikasý ve Batý Trakya,” pp. 312.
29 Ibid. See also idem, Türk-Yunan Ýliþkileri’nde Batý Trakya Sorunu, pp. 43. See idem, “Batý
Trakya’daki Müslüman Türk Azýnlýðý,” pp. 155. Oran stresses that three different Sevres treaties
were concluded on 10 August 1920 in the French city of Sevres: 1) The Sevres Agreement which
divided the Ottoman Empire; referred to as the “Ottoman Sevres” by the author, 2) The Sevres
Agreement which gave Western Thrace to Greece, referred to as “Thracian Sevres” by Oran and; 3)
the third Sevres agreement named by Oran “Greek Sevres”, signed by Greece and the Allies,
guaranteeing the protection of minorities in Greece. Oran refers to British Foreign and State Papers,
vol. 113, no. 471, for the full text of the “Greek Sevres”.
30 Oran, “Türk Dýþ Politikasý ve Batý Trakya,” pp. 312. See Appendix B.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid. For full text of these conventions and agreements, see Stephen Ladas, The Exchange of
Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), part II passim,
and appendices therein. Texts in French.
33 Hugh Poulton, “Ethnic Turks and Muslims in the Balkans and Cyprus,” in Mediterranean Politics,
Richard Gillespie ed. (London: Pinter, 1996), pp. 110-112.
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for instance, where Turkey displays more power as one of the guarantor states.
Poulton further notes34 that the consistent feature of the way the Greek government
handles issues pertaining to Western Thrace since 1960s has been reciprocation, one
which implies tit-for-tat arguments as aforemetioned.35
Viewed in retrospect, the history of Western Thrace Turks reflects attempts of
independence movements, the first of which took place after the 1878 San Stefano
Agreement. This agreement gave Western Thrace to Bulgaria, causing the Turks in
the region to revolt which resulted in the establishment of an interim government
named “Rhodope Government”36. Yet, owing to the revision of the agreement in the
Congress of Berlin, this government was annulled after eight years in 20 April 1886.
The second attempt is seen during the 1913 Balkan War when Enver Bey ordered
Commander Kuþçubaþý Eþref and his 116 soldiers to reach the region where they
had been notified the Turks were being annihilated by Bulgarian gangs. The Turkish
battalion quelled the riot and “Western Thrace Government” was set up on 31
August 1913 which would last only fifty-eight days.37 The third Western Thrace
Turkish Administration was set up by Fuat (Balkan) on 30 July 1915, which held
power until 27 September 1817. This government also proved to be short-lived due
to the negative international and regional conjuncture of the time.38 The fourth and
the longest attempt of independence movement was the “Western Thrace National
                                                
34 Poulton, “Ethnic Turks and Muslims in the Balkans and Cyprus,” pp. 112.
35 Hakký Akalýn, Turkey and Greece: On the Way to Another War? (Ankara: Net, 1999), pp. 162.
36 Hatipoðlu, Yunanistan’da Etnik Gruplar, pp 23; and Oran, Türk-Yunan Ýliþkilerinde Batý Trakya
Sorunu, pp. 9.
37 Ibid. See also Ahmet Kayýhan, Lozan ve Batý Trakya (Ýstanbul: Türkiye Basýmevi, 1967), pp. 6-
12. The members of this government were Hüseyin Paþa, Mehmet Paþazade, Þükrü Bey, Hacý Saffet
Bey of Alexandroupolis, Hafýz Galip Efendi of Komotini, Hacý Ýsa Efendi of Xanthi, head of
government Dersiam Salih Efendi, Major Süleyman Askeri Bey of Alexandroupolis; and Hilmi Paþa
of Xanthi.  Ibid., pp. 7.
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Government”39 which annulled itself as a consequence of the 1923 Treaty of
Lausanne.40 The last phase in this chain of attempts is the ideological struggle which
soon turned to be disapproved by the Turkish community, as it was aimed at starting
a new independence movement, however this time under Stalinist principles. The
Turkish community came to realize that this was not a national struggle and it did not
take long before it dissolved in its time.41
Through these phases, Turkish community came to be labeled as a Muslim minority
by Greece, which in due course manifest uneasiness in several aspects of life. To
start with, as regards Article 19, Turks are known to have lost citizenship, the mostly
heard of examples being students who went abroad to study in Turkey or Germany
and found that they had lost citizenship when they tried to return to Greece and were
not permitted to come back.42 Before the law was abrogated in 1998, it was
acknowledged by lawyers representing the Turkish minority that if an ethnic Turk
was out of the country, the police would ask his/her neighbors if s/he would return to
Greece. If they received “no” as an answer, the police would send a notice to the
Ministry of the Interior to deal with the matter, which mostly was followed by a
decision of stripping citizenship. The decision would be printed in the official
gazette, yet the person would not be notified thereof.43 Among all, it is notable that
Semahat Haliloglou and Arap Haliloglou lost their citizenship when they were doing
                                                                                                                                          
38 Celalettin Yücel, Dýþ Türkler (Ýstanbul: Hun, 1976), pp. 133.
39 “Batý Trakya Devlet-i Muvakkatesi” or “Batý Trakya Ulusal Hükümeti”.
40 Kayýhan, Lozan ve Batý Trakya, pp. 11
41 see ibid., pp. 10-11, where the author gives details on the issue on how this struggle was initiated in
1946 by “Comrade Ekrem”, son a Circassian Bey of Adapazarý and a graduate of Mitilini Greek High
School, when he fled the Alexandroupolis Prison to join communist gerilla warfare in Greece, and
how he could not manage to get the support of Turkish community.
42 Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity, pp. 12.
43 see ibid., pp. 12-13 for several citizenship stripping cases.
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their military service in the Greek Army.44 It has also been reported that despite
encouraging Turks to go to different regions in Greece to find jobs, the Greek
authorities later stipulated that the Turks stayed where they settled; and threatened
them on the grounds that they would be expelled from their jobs unless they took
Greek names.45
Secondly, education stands as another field in which certain friction has been traced
particularly since 1950s. As per a culture agreement concluded on the basis of
reciprocity (1951), Turkey sends teachers to Greece and young people of Western
Thrace come to Turkey to take teachers’ training with the aim of going back to
Western Thrace and to teach there.46  In the 1950s, the Greek authorities referred to
the Turkish primary schools as “Turkish” by name, as per law 3065/1954 which the
Turks called “Marshall Papagos Law”, yet in the late 1950s, the official Greek
changed and Greece chose to use the term “Muslim” for schools, peoples, etc...47
When the Junta administration took power in 1967, the education of the Turkish
minority embarked in its most uneasy phase whereby the Greek government began to
appoint the administrative boards of Turkish schools, which until then were chosen
by Turkish parents. Transfer of schoolbooks from Turkey was stopped by 1951 and
the use of Turkish names were banned. 48 Ethnic Turkish children have been reported
to be taught with out-dated Turkish schoolbooks and it is also acknowledged that
Turkish language teachers are trained in a special academy in Thessaloniki; they do
                                                
44 Hatipoðlu, Yunanistan’da Etnik Gruplar, pp. 35 and Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity, pp. 12.
45 Hatipoðlu, Yunanistan’da Etnik Gruplar, pp. 35; and Oran, Türk -Yunan Ýliþkilerinde Batý Trakya
Sorunu, pp. 111-113.
46 Oran, “Batý Trakya’daki Müslüman Türk Azýnlýðý,” pp. 158-159.
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not speak Turkish well due to a backward curriculum they receive, with little contact
with developments in Turkey. 49 A Greek law dated May 1984 that stipulated that the
entrance examinations to the two secondary Turkish minority schools in Komotini
and Xanthi, as well as graduation examinations had to be in Greek led to a
remarkable decline in the number of pupils - from 227 in Xanthi and 305 in
Komotini in 1983-84, to 85 and 42 respectively in 1986-87.50 As reported by
Helsinki Watch, according to the former Turkish Consul to Komotini, Mr. Önder
Alpmen, fewer than 10 % of the students who graduate from Turkish elementary
schools51 continue to attend Greek secondary schools, 70 % of whom are said to
come to Turkey to attend secondary school.
As regards the out-dated content of the books, the Greek government sources, as
reported in Dateline, 19 May 1990, claim that the schoolbook issue was the fault of
Turkey and not Greece. The former Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis is
known to have stated that schoolbooks were supposed to be specifically adapted for
use by Greek nationals who are members of Muslims minority, under the terms of
the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Mitsotakis claimed that he had requested changes to be
made by the Turkish educational authorities which he claimed were never done. In
line with this, Greek authorities objected to those schoolbooks as, they said, these
were intended to educate citizens of Turkey.52
                                                                                                                                          
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Poulton, “Ethnic and Muslims in the Balkans and Cyprus,” pp. 112.
50 Ibid.
51 Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity, pp. 40. According to the then Greek Information Office
Director Papaconstantinou, there existed 300 primary schools, 2 Muslim religious schools, two
secular high schools, and four gymnasia serving the “Muslim” minority in Western Thrace.
52 Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity, pp. 42. See also “Ismarlama Kitaba Protesto,” in Batý
Trakya’nýn Sesi, vol. 40, March, 1992, pp.4.
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The Greek government was also reported to inhibit Turks’ freedom of movement
through passport seizures, which by the Turkish community was said to be “many”
in 1989. In some cases, people returning to Greece were told that their passports
were no longer valid, while in some police came to people’s homes and demanded
passports. In most cases the passports were returned after two to eight months, yet
with no explanation. The number of such people amounted to 40-50 in 1989.53
Regarding the denial of ethnic identity, it is notable that the Greek policy changed
over the years54 whereby for instance; 1) a geography book of 1933 written in
Turkey was described as “a Turkish book” by Greece, 2) a Turkish school in
Komotini about forty years ago, in which a sign identified the school as “Turkish
elementary school”, on which the name was written in Turkish and Greek, 3)
protocols of curricula in Turkish elementary schools for the educational year 1957-
58; wherein the schools were referred to as “Turkish schools”, 4) an elementary
school diploma dated 10 June 1957, written in Greek and Turkish, in which 13-year-
old Hatice Ýmam was identified as a “Turk” and; 5)two emergency orders dated
1954 and 1955 in which the chief administrator of Thrace ordered relevant
municipalities to change all signs from “Muslim minority” to “Turkish minority”. 55
                                                
53 Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity, pp. 13. Among many, lawyer Adem Bekiroglou’s passport
was seized for three months in 1989 as he was on his way to Turkey. When Bekiroglou asked the
officer why his passport had been confiscated, he replied: “I don’t know the reason. I have my
orders.” After forwarding the action to the Court, Bekiroglou received a phonecall three months later
and was told to come and take his passport. He took back his passport at the police station, yet with
no explanation.
54 Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity, pp. 14.
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The two figures who stood out as the negative recipients of these policies were Dr.
Sadýk Ahmet and Ýsmail Þerif, against whom cases were brought as of  January
1990 during an election campaign on the grounds that they distributed campaign
literature referring by name to “Turkish minority”; pursuant to which they received
subpoenas on charges with:
♦ slander and misinformation in Komotini during the last ten days
of October 1989, in violation of Articles 245, 320 and 321 of the
Criminal Procedure Law, by saying that candidates of New
Democracy, Left Coalition, and PASOK parties had created an
atmosphere of terror and anarchy; and;
♦ violating Article 192 of the Penal Code by “openly or indirectly
inciting citizens to violence or creating rifts among the
population at the expense of social peace” by the use of the
word “Turkish”.56
Dr. Ahmet and Mr. Þerif were found “not guilty” of slander and misinformation; but
“guilty” of disturbing public order as per Article 192 of the Greek Penal Code. They
spent 64 days in prison in Thessaloniki; yet the Court of Appeals released them on
the condition that they paid their fines of  $2800 and $1875, respectively, in place of
the remainder of their prison terms; Dr. Ahmet was soon elected an independent MP
on 8 April 1990.57
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On the other hand, Turks of Western Thrace are known to have complained that their
religious freedom had been violated through refusal of permission to repair and/or to
build old mosques, denial of the right to choose muftis and through efforts to control
the minority’s wakfs.58 To cite but a couple of examples, it is known that on 4
February 1989, the Nomark of Komotini wrote that permission from the Greek
Archbishop was required in order to build a mosque (see Appendix D), and in the
village of Diomilia in the outskirts of Xanthi, exists an old mosque among many
others, which has been waiting for permission of repair for 25 years.59
Restrictions in political and social life such as those noticed in degrading treatment
by the security forces, freedom of expression, license acquisition and restraints in
business and professional life are reported to be the components of the sufferings of
the Turkish minority. Greek security forces frequently call in Turks for interrogation,
who assist outside observers; magazines and newspapers from Turkey would not be
permitted entry until recently, air and land traffic was heralded during 1989 elections
and Turkish-Greek border crossings were closed shortly prior to the elections to keep
Turks from returning to vote, Turks are rarely allowed to obtain driving licenses;
there are reportedly no Turkish-owned factories, gas stations or pharmacies, no
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Turkish high-ranking civil servants. Turks cannot take credit from Greek banks,
either.60
Apart from those reported, it is also documented that the Greek government’s
expropriation of land and cemeteries in Western Thrace incited complaints on the
minority’s end, in that for instance, the government confiscated 3000 to 4000 acres
to build the University of Thrace on the outskirts of Komotini. Related with the
issue, the Greek Information Office Director Nikos Papaconstantinou stated that “for
the establishment of the University, in Komotini 85 % of the ....land belonged to
Muslims,....in Xanthi, 82 % of the appropriated land belonged to Christians. The
allegations regarding a discriminatory Greek land policy against the Thracian
Muslims have no scientific base whatsoever.”61
3. 4  MACEDONIANS IN GREECE
In geographic terms, the heart of Greek Macedonia is the littoral plain of
Thessaloniki, stretching inward, starting from Thermaic Gulf, across which flow the
Rivers of Haliakmon, Loudias and Gallikos.62 Poulton writes that Macedonia, in
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general terms, is the area surrounded in the north by the Skopska Crna Gora and Shar
Planina Mountains; in the east by the Rila and Rhodope Mountains; in the south by
the Aegean Coast around Thessaloniki, Mount Olympus and Pindus mountains; and
in the west by Ohrid and Prespa lakes.63 The area is a geographic unit located around
the Vardar/Axios, the Struma/Strimon and the Mesta/Nestos river valleys, which is
referred to as “geographic Macedonia”, comprising of 67,000 square kilometers,
divided between the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Greece
and Bulgaria.64
Viewed in historical perspective, it has been argued that the mindset which was
traced as influential on the official Greek practices and policies in the aftermath of
the proclamation of the Greek state, more specifically later in 1880s, has been
exemplified by the words of Kharilaos Trikoupis, the former Greek Prime Minister:
“When the Great War breaks out, Macedonia will become Greek or Bulgarian,
according to who wins... And if we take it, we will make them all Greeks.”65 Atrocity
in the region by Greeks in parallel terms with this policy in the 19th and 20th centuries
have been documented officially as well as scholarly.66 The chronological history of
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Macedonia as of 725 B.C., the year when the Kingdom of Macedon was established,
up until the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest, by which the Ottoman Empire lost the
territory, reflects Hun, Slav, Bulgarian, Byzantine and Serbian encounters.67
As Hill points out68, estimates regarding Macedonians in Greek Macedonia vary
between 10,000 and 300,000 citing the U.S Department of State accounts’ related
reference as “under 10,000 to 50,000 or more” and also the Encyclopaedia Britannica
Books of the Year 1987 and 1992 as 180,000 and 150,000, respectively, together
with Poulton’s estimate of 200,000. Historical statistics regarding Macedonian
population estimates by Greece is noted with lower figures or even as non-existing as
in the Greek census of 1940, wherein Greeks, Turks, Slavs, Vlahs and Jews were
observed as constituents of population of Greek Macedonia, but Macedonians.69 This
practice in fact, though not precisely similar, appears to have a precedent in 1919,
when with Article 56 of the Treaty of Neuilly it was stipulated that “a voluntary
exchange of populations be made” between Greece and Bulgaria. According to the
agreement, ethnic Bulgarians of Greece (=Macedonians) would be exchanged for
ethnic Greeks of Bulgaria; however, this voluntary exchange in short term was
transformed into a compulsory one by Greece as regards Macedonians, which forced
them to emigrate to Bulgaria.70 Relevant literature labels new settlements in Greek
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Macedonia as “a great success”71 in terms of hellenizing the region by those coming
from Anatolia after the 1922 Turkish-Greek War. Pursuant to WW I, the Greek
practices persisted more or less the same; this time Macedonians were named as
“Slavomacedonians” and towards the mid-1920s, all Macedonian names were
changed with Greeks ones.72  Yet, worse proved to be the dictatorship of General
Metaxas who took power in 1936 with coup d’état which lasted five years, a period
followed by an even worse one: World War II. Metaxas regime viewed the minority
as a danger to Greece’s security and many Macedonians were interned from the
border regions with Yugoslavia; furthermore night schools were opened to teach
adults Slavs Greek.73
The repression was stepped up during the Greco-Italian War in 1940, despite many
Macedonians fighting loyally in Greek army against Italians. The ensuing Civil War
saw the exodus of many Slavs together with Greek Communist Party (
Kommunistiko Komma Elladas) members fleeing to Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of
the Civil War, Greek state took such steps as to remove “undesirable aliens” from
border regions with Yugoslavia through Decree numbered 2536, dated 1953, enacted
to colonize these northern territories “with new colonists having healthy national
consciousness”.74 By 1954, Papagos government resolved to remove all
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Macedonians from official posts in Greek Macedonia and in bordering regions
peasants were not permitted to move from their villages; moreover, inhabitants of
villages near Lerin, Kostur and Kajlari were asked to publicly confirm before
officials that they did not speak Macedonian; which finally led to emigration to
Australia or Canada.75 Regardless of the type of government in power, whether
democratic or military dictatorship of 1967-1974, the official practices with respect
to Macedonian minority is observed almost constant which led to the evolution of a
Macedonian nationalism stronger among emigrants from Greece, than nationals in
Macedonia proper.76 It is also acknowledged that the property of those Macedonians
who emigrated was confiscated by Greek government by Decree 2536/1953, with
Article 19 of the Citizenship Code depriving them of their citizenship, as well.
Through another law enacted thereafter, the Greek state decided that the property
would be returned to refugees who were “Greek by birth” which required a change in
their names. This practice was also observed when Lafter Lajovski, one of the
participants of over 100 former refugees, wished to visit Greek Macedonia along
with other refugees; but was turned back at the border by Greek officials stating he
should change his name to a Greek one if he wanted to enter Greece; his Canadian
citizenship apparently did not make any change.77
As of 1981, when PASOK came to power with Andreas Papandreou at its head,
actions against Macedonians escalated and Papandreou is known to have explicitly
                                                                                                                                          
The Development of a Greek Macedonian Cultural Identity Since 1912, Peter Mackridge and Eleni
Yannakakis eds. (London: Berg, 1997), pp. 111-131.
75 Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, pp. 179.
76 Ibid.
77 Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, pp. 180.
69
denied the existence of a Macedonian minority stating he would not accept any
dialogue on the matter.78
The Greek conservative party, Nea Demokratia, on the other hand also continued its
hostility to Macedonians and in 1986 set up a monitoring center in Florina to monitor
broadcasts from Skopje.79
Today it is known that teaching of Macedonian is banned and a Macedonian baby
cannot be given a Macedonian name, since the Greek priests who approve birth
certificates accept only Greek names.80 It is also reported that priests refuse to marry
Macedonian couples unless assured no Macedonian dances shall take place, as this
displays Macedonian feelings. Stating this “feeling” is also known to have caused
two minority activists Christos Sideropoulos and Tasos Boulis to be sentenced to
five months imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 drachmas; as these gentlemen stated
that they felt “Macedonian”.81  Also, in 1990 when 54 Macedonians decided to
establish a Macedonian Cultural Association in Florina, Greek Courts refused the
application as the applicants, they said, presumed there was a Macedonian minority
in Greece. Forwarding the case to the European Court of Human Rights, the minority
received an answer that the Court considered the aims of the minority clear and
legitimate; and convicted Greece. The Macedonian churches in Greece are also
reported closed as the Greek Orthodox Church claims the Macedonian church in
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Ohrid is legitimate. 82 In line with this, a Macedonian monk named Nikodimos
Tsarknias, who opposed the Greek church was dismissed from his ecclesiastical post
due to his identification as a Macedonian.83
After Papandreou’s fall from power in 1990, a mass demonstration in Skopje
protesting the lack of minority rights for Macedonia was organized. The escalation
was even deteriorated with the break-up of Yugoslavia and the proclamation of the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia followed suit.84 The use of certain country
symbols such as the star of Vergina on the Macedonian flag, harnessing nationalism
in Greece led to vetoing this new state with the name “Macedonia”. Greece saw this
provocative, as it is a symbol used by the ancient Macedonian royal dynasty in Greek
Macedonia which was found in King Philip’s tomb in Greece. Greece also received
Skopje’s adoption of the image of the Whiter Tower, the symbol of Thessaloniki in
Greek Macedonia, on its commemorative currency as “threatening”, multiplied by
the use of the name “Macedonia” itself, which caused Greeks to think that the new
state coveted the relevant Greek territory.85 It has been argued that the Macedonian
issue was widely articulated by the nationalistic Greek media in its length, projecting
the issue on public through a bulk of headlines, distribution of articles, news reports
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and editorials; most significantly in newspapers of To Vima, Eleftherotypia,
Eleftheros Typos, Kathimerini and Macedonia.86
Finally to speak about the attitudes of the society in Greece, it would not be
erroneous to suggest that they vary depending on political affiliation or personal
perceptions. Just as extreme “Greek chauvinists are known to have called for the
liquidation of all Macedonians, whether in Greece or elsewhere”87, some left-wing
and a portion of Greek population sympathize with Macedonians which might entail
there exists amicable relations between Greeks and Macedonians in Greece, despite
cases reported.88
3.5  ALBANIANS IN GREECE
Ethnic Albanians in Greece can be categorized in three groups: 1) Orthodox
Albanians, 2) Cham Albanians and 3) migrant Albanian nationals who seek refuge in
Greece for economic reasons.89 In general however, Albanians have come to be
believed to be of Illyrian origins, one of the ancient peoples of the Balkan
peninsula.90 A number of dimensions and restraints involved in wider Greek-
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Albanian relations have been described by Hall as significant as to project the
strained nature of relations between the two states on the issues of mutual minorities
as well.91 First, Greeks tend to perceive Albanians as “Islamic”, historically
associating them with the Ottoman rule, which leads to viewing them as an implicit
threat to Greek Orthodoxy. Second, Greeks have been known to claim that the
treatment of the ethnic Greeks in Albania reflects violation of human rights, while
Albanians have traditionally been fearful of Greek irredentism in the region. Third,
Greece views Albania as a source of military threat, be it directly or be it through
third parties, in that, it accuses Albania of having assisted Greek communists during
the Civil War and, it is also known that Greece was attacked by fascist Italy in WW
II from Albanian territory. Fourth, labor migration to Greece by Albanians seeking
better economic and social standards became an issue and raised the level of
attention drawn to Greece’s minority rights record. Fifth, the unfavorable Greek
attitude towards newly born FYROM, which had been touched upon in the previous
section, coupled with an even stronger dubious attitude as regards the position of
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, FYROM and Montenegro, with a number of issues of
mutual interest between the countries involved. Sixth, while Greek entrepreneurs
engaged in economic reinvigoration in Southern Albania, the Greek state as opposed
to that, held up EU assistance for Albania on the grounds that Albania mistreated
Greek minority in its territory, also resenting at Italy’s increasing ties with and
domination of Albania in trade.92
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Related with the first point, it is known for example that within the Ottoman Empire,
when revolt attempts by Greek nationalists would give signals, Albanians would be
sent in to subdue the turmoil, which later incited Greeks to think the Albanians
obstructed Greek independence.93 Today, the Greek attitude towards Orthodox
Albanians reflects similarity with that pertaining to other minorities in the country,
that is, they claim those Orthodox Albanians as “Greek”, leaving aside their ethnic
origins.
Regarding the population of ethnic Albanians in its territory, Greece announced two
figures which belong to 1928 and 1951, reflecting the number of “those speaking
Albanian” as 18,773 and 22,736, respectively; yet it is argued that subsequent
censuses do not refer by name to the minority, in line with the claims of homogeneity
of the country and its people.94
In geographic terms, Albanians, who refer to themselves as “Shiqiptar”, to their
country as “Shiqipiri”, and to their language as “Arberishtja”, are traced to be
localized in Albania, Kosovo, FYROM and in the regions of Epirus, Thesprotia
(Chameria), Attica, Islet of Angistri; and in the island of Egina in Greece.95
                                                
93 Ibid.
94 Hatipoðlu, Yunanistan’da Etnik Gruplar, pp. 100. On the Albanians’ end, it has been posited by
Democratic Chameria League that they amount to 100,000, while Föderalistische Union Europaischer
Volksgruppen - FUEV ( Federal Union of European Nationalities - FUEN) gives an approximate
figure, 95,000. See Poulton, The Balkans, pp. 189 for details. For a historical account of Greco-
Albanian issue with various aspects, see Léon Maccas, La Question Gréco-Albanaise (Nancy: Berger-
Levrault, 1921).
95 Hatipoðlu, Yunanistan’da Etnik Gruplar, pp. 101, writes that “Shiqiptari” means people “of eagle-
like origin”; and that following the Danubian Basin as of 1st century B.C, the Illyrians came to Epirus
and to the coastal territories of Adriatic; later fighting against Hellenes, Romans, Byzantines,
Bulgarians, Serbs and Venetians. By 11th century, they became to be known as “Albanians” who in
15th century came under the Ottoman rule. It was in 1912-1913 London Ambassadors Conference that
the borders of Albania were specified, annexing Southern Epirus to Greece and the ensuing WW I
caused many emigrations from Greece. Hatipoðlu also states that through the Convention Regarding
74
It has been posited that the Albanians tended to become hellenicized due to the
Greek education and political system.96 By the same token, the Greek Helsinki
reports underscore that army and urbanization have also been the most effective
mechanisms of hellenization, aided by judiciary system ready to “denounce and
punish all forms of behavior inconsistent with the state’s nationalist culture”.97 As
Hatipoðlu and Poulton point out, the massive Albanian community in Greece could
speak their mother tongue publicly and they had their own established court in
Plaka.98 Yet, later on, the situation was visibly altered with WW II, when Greece
claimed that Albanians had cooperated with fascist Italians against Greece;
Albanians were later deported in masses or exiled to other regions in the country.
Today, the use of the Albanian language is banned; moreover it is known that there
has been a rather widespread indifference among Albanians about the fate of their
mother tongue along with self-depreciation in that, “they have been led by the
dominant unilingual Greek culture to believe that these languages are deficient, lack
proper grammatical structure, have a poor vocabulary”.99 Now and then, it is also
observed that young people discourage their parents from using the language in
public, causing the middle-aged and elderly people of the minority to use the
language, while a much less younger generation usually addressing older people in
family context to make fun of non-speakers of Greek speak Albanian.100
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Albanians have been seen as dispersed throughout Greece exiled, or hellenicized;
nevertheless, since 1980s, efforts to preserve the culture have been made whereby
four associations were created: Arvanitikos Syndesmos Hellados (the Arvanite
League of Greece), Kentro Arvanitikou Politismou (Center for Arvanite Culture),
Arvanitikos Syllagos Ano Liosion (Arvanite Association of Ano Liosia), and Syllagos
Arvaniton Corinthas (Association of Arvanites of Corinthia).101
As regards Cham Albanians, it is shown that between 1921 and 1926, Greece began
to deport Muslim Albanians from Chameria, so as to designate their lands to Greeks
coming from Anatolia.102 In 1924, the League of Nations protested about the
deportation of the Chams, with no result. In 1944, the process was repeated since the
Greek government was determined to establish ethnically homogeneous border
regions whereby approximately 35,000 Cham Albanians fled to Albania, Turkey or
to other regions in Greece. The championing figure of this process was General
Napoleon Zervas, opposed to both the communist EAM - ELAS groups and non-
Greek elements in Greece.103 Within this period, on 27 June 1944, Greek criminal
bands engaged in the worst ethnic cleansing in the town of Paramyty.104
After the war, the Albanian government forwarded the issue to Paris Peace
Conference which soon recognized the plight of Chams and demanded repatriation
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and recovery of their property.105 The Parliament of the Albanian Republic
proclaimed 27 June 1944 as the Commemoration Day for the Massacred Albanians
of Chameria and a related monument was built up in Konispol.106  Former Greek
Prime Minister Mitsotakis in a speech delivered in Tirana in 1992 stated that Cham
Albanians were war criminals as they had cooperated with Germany and Italy in
WW II and would not be permitted to return to Greece; despite the fact that Cham
Albanians were loyally fighting against the Axis powers, and that they had been the
first group to resist the Italian invasion.107
With a view to modifying the demographic mosaic in Chameria, Greece localized the
region with Greeks, Vlahs and the Roma, in the aftermath of WW II, as it appeared
to the Greek government that the province would remain dubious with the Albanian
population left therein.108
On the other hand, Greece saw an influx of Albanian migrants seeking better
economic conditions, pursuant to the collapse of communist regime in Albania in
1991. As Hall stresses, those immigrants with family connections in Greece could
more or less integrate themselves relatively easily, however, others rather found
themselves constituting a lower class in society and economy, usually becoming
scapegoats for increasing incidents of crime109, also they were used by some Greeks
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http://www.turk-yunan.gen.tr/english/minority/index.html
108 Ethnic Albanians in Greece, pp. 9. See also “The Cham Issue is Still a Taboo for Greece”,
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109 Hall, “Recent Developments in Greek-Albanian Relations”, pp. 89.
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in black market and smuggling, by which Albanians were described willing to be
exploited as they could make more money in such a way than in Albania.110
By December 1991, the Government began expulsions of illegal immigrants which
through “Operation Scooba” amounted to 100,000; the reasons for Greece for the
removal of Albanians were at least three-fold: 1) Albanians were causing saturation
in Greek labor market and thus unemployment, 2) their crime record appeared more
than the average, and 3) Greece was concerned on the issue of awakening of Islam in
post-communist Albania and its possible impact on Greek Orthodox state.111
The Greek police is said to have exerted physical violence and deported
approximately 300,000 Albanian nationals who had in fact obtained required
documents in the 1990s, furthermore, their savings and personal belongings were
said to be confiscated.112 Apart from these, reports indicate that Albanians who
accepted Greek citizenship and Orthodoxy were given work permits and even in
some cases Greek passports.113 Citing Eugenia Droukas, Hatipoðlu114 writes that
Albanians faced the same treatment as “Helots” of the antique period; Helots being
those belonging to the lowest stratum in the society in ancient Greece, likening the
term to the situation of the Turks in Germany which was once seen as such. On the
other hand, it has been argued that Albanians along with other illegal immigrants in
general are valuable, and even essential for small businesses’ survival, especially in
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agriculture.115 The same argument goes on to maintain that the “dangerous Albanian”
stereotype was in fact invented initially by the Greek police and reinforced by the
media and subsequently by the state, rather than the society itself.116
In general terms, Greece’s far-fetched perception that Greeks have no link or
intermingling in any form or shape with any ethnic group in their vicinity manifests
itself unchanged in the treatment of Albanians, too.117 In 2000, a 15-year-old boy
named Odysseus Cenai, invoked much debate as to whether an Albanian boy should
carry the Greek flag in a national day parade. The boy happened to excel in his
school, Nea Mihaniona High School in Thessaloniki, yet stayed at home instead of
leading his school in the parade. Greek Justice Minister Evangelos Yannopoulos
insisted that the flag could only be carried by Greeks on a national day. Ironically,
the Greek Ministry of Education dictates that the student who has the best grades
gets to lead the National Day Parade on October 28. However, despite his Greek
name and the Greek education he received, Odysseus Cenai was not allowed to carry
the flag, and had to leave the task to a Greek student at school.118
3. 6  VLAHS IN GREECE (KOUTSOVLAHS OR AROMANIANS)
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Vlahs are those Latin people who speak a form of Romanian, living mostly in Pindus
mountains, Epirus, Thessaly and Greek Macedonia. As regards population figures,
emigré Vlahs claim approximately 600,000 Vlahs to be living in Greece; and the
Federal Union of European Nationalities put the figure as 300,000, while the 1935
and 1951 censuses in Greece showed 19,703 and 39,855 Vlahs in the country.119
Vlahs are mostly Hellenophile and are almost all Orthodox; they tend to identify
themselves with Greeks owing to the Greek education they receive; yet those who do
not feel so are known to have emigrated causing a much stronger nationalist feeling
in the diaspora.120 Apparently, there is no separatist movement among Vlahs in
Greece, despite rarely reported hostility from nationalistic sections in Greek society
against the use of Vlah language.121 It has been reported that Sotiris Bletsas of the
Vlah minority was arrested in 1995 after distributing European Bureau for Lesser
Used Languages (EBLUL) publications; which invoked the European Commission
to ask the Greek government for more information on the conviction of the
activist.122 Just as Albanian language is discouraged to be used; so is the Vlah;
although since 1984, an annual Vlah festival is organized in which Vlahs songs and
dances are performed.123 It might be posited that Vlahs are not viewed as threatening
element against Hellenic unity, which is more neatly seen in the words of Greek
President Kostis Stephanopoulos when he praised the patriotic spirit of Vlahs during
his two-day visit in Pindus in 1998; emphasizing that the region was the backbone of
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Greece with its people constituting the backbone of Hellenism.124  Still, the official
viewpoint holds that “the Vlahs are those Greek people who speak an unusual
dialect.”125
3.  7  POMAKS IN GREECE
Pomaks live in Western Thrace, with a population of around 30,000 and their
language “Pomakika/Pomakçi” belongs to the Bulgaro-Macedonian linguistic
group.126 They are officially recognized as a Muslim minority in accordance with the
1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Despite certain arguments asserting that very little is
known about historical origins of Pomaks’ evolution127, there indeed exists relevant
literature on the issue, yet with remarkable controversy, in that, Bulgarian, Greek and
Turkish sources all refer to Pomaks as their respective national components. The
Greek scholars are observed to consider Pomaks “to be the descendants of ancient
Thracian tribes which were in turn Hellenized, Latinized, Slavized, Christianized and
finally Islamized.”128
Pomaks tend to identify themselves with Turks, which has been argued as “helped by
Greece” in 1951 to introduce Turkish education for Pomaks in an effort to dissociate
them from Bulgarians.129 Yet, currently the Pomaks resent new attempts of Greek
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authorities since 1994 to dissociate them from Turks as Greece holds the view that
“...schoolbooks come directly from Turkey, all the Turkish TV channels pour out the
Kemalic venom on the region, alienating the cultural structure of the Pomak
peculiarity.”130 In 1999 deputy Stavros Xarhakos of Nea Demokratia submitted a
question to the European Parliament pinpointing “the odd Greeks tactics of forcing
Pomaks to be taught in Turkish schools, and thus their Turkification, instead of
promoting their peculiarity”, and questions if this is in line with EU principles and
goals, a question of self-critique whose second half requires consideration by Greece,
regarding all its minorities, and not only the Pomaks.131
3.  8  THE ROMA (GYPSIES) IN GREECE
Living in Greek Macedonia, Western Thrace and Athens specifically, the Roma
community is estimated as 140,000 by outside observers, while Greek officials give
far lower figures.132 Tong writes that although Gypsies prefer nomadic  life styles,
there are many exceptions in Greece such as stable factory workers or sharecroppers;
yet still living under pressures of poverty, a fact about which the Gypsies make irony
and call their ghetto in Thessaloniki “Little Paris”.133
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After visiting Roma camps in Greece in 2001, Josephine Vespaget, Chair of the
Specialist Group on Roma of the Council of Europe, stated that there was
“institutionalized apartheid for many Roma in Greece whereby they were forcefully
settled in segregated areas isolated from the rest of the society, referring to Article
3.1 of a 1983 Ministerial decision.134 Minority Rights Group in 1999 also reported
that the local Greek authorities evicted Roma families in Evasmos, Ano Liossia,
Ioannina, Trikala and Phoenikas.135 Similarly, as Poulton argues, a 1979 law passed
to enable the Muslim Roma to obtain identity cards had little effect due to lacking
birth certificates; as these people have only in practice been accepted as Greek
citizens after baptism by the Orthodox church.136 Parallel to the European
Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) report that confirms Greece’s
evictions without providing alternative accommodation and also exclusion of the
Roma from citizenship rights137, the Greek delegation in OSCE Implementation
Meeting on Human Dimension in Warsaw in 1998, accepted Roma’s situation with
accuracy: “I wish to state in all honesty that I cannot....justify the unjustifiable.....we
do recognize that the situation of Roma in Greece is still far from satisfactory.....”138
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Although recently a City Municipality Network for Gypsy Citizens was created
together with a 1996 Program of Social Integration of Greek Gypsies and an
Ombudsman Office to better the situation of Roma; it is evident that the Roma are at
the lowest stratum of social structure in Greece, as elsewhere in the world.139
3.  9  JEWS IN GREECE
The Jewish population in Greece is estimated as around 5,000; most of them living in
Thessaloniki and Athens.140 According to Strabo, Jewish presence in Greece dates to
85 B.C; yet it was in 1492 when Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain proclaimed the
Edict of Expulsion for the Jews of Spain that over 20,000 Sephardic and Iberian Jews
arrived in Thessaloniki in masses after Sultan Bayezid II proclaimed the exiled Jews
would be welcome in the Ottoman Empire.141 Lewkowicz, among many in the
related literature, states that Jews enjoyed liberty among the Turks; pointing to the
relative absence of anti-Ottoman sentiments among Jewish Greeks; while Orthodox
Greeks associated the Ottoman rule with “four hundred years of slavery”.142
Lewkowicz143 and Goldberg144 commonly posit that although almost every Jew faced
times of anti-Semitic prejudice in Greece, the majority of Jews do not consider
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Greece an anti-Semitic state, while Goldberg labels Greek anti-Semitism “utterly
subliminal”, so difficult to pinpoint, but less difficult to combat.145
During WW II Greece deported more than 65,000 Jews in 1943 to concentration
camps despite protests of Greek intellectual and some religious leaders and in the
ensuing years anti-Semitic sentiments persisted with the Panellinion Sosialistikon
Kinema (PASOK) period, harboring much of the sentiment, when for instance
Greece saw extreme right organizations, the press and other literature replete with
comparison of Jews to Nazis during Israeli invasion of Lebanon, naming them
“worthy descendants of Hitler”; and one socialist MP accusing “the Jews, the
Masons and the CIA” for 1967 coup d’état in Greece.146
Anti-Semitic incidents in Greece are in general attacks on Jewish monuments,
Swastikas and Nazi slogans written and painted on walls, houses and cemeteries of
Jews and occasional anti-Semitic remarks of Church officials and MPs.147 To cite
one, as Smith reports, the crisis over civilian identity cards in Greece showed once
again that Athens was the target of criticism by European Court of Human Rights for
violations involving religious minorities, whereby Jews along with others were
negative recipients; in an atmosphere where one million Greeks cheered Archbishop
Christodoulas in 2000 saying “Our faith is our foundation of identity. If you abolish
one, you abolish the other.”148 Also on the 62nd anniversary of “Kristallnacht” in
                                                
145 Ibid.
146 see “Greece” available on http://www.axt.org.uk/antisem/archive/archive2/greece/greece.htm,; see
also Daniel Perdurant, “Antisemitism in Contemporary Greek Society,” available on
http://www2huji.ac.il/www-jcd/acta.html.
147 Ibid.
148 Helena Smith, “The Misery of Being Greek,” available on http://www.alb.net.com/pipermail/albsa-
info/2000-August/000495.html. The ID cards issue turned into a crisis in Greece in the fall of 2000,
bringing against on the one hand the state trying to reconcile with EU standards; and on the other the
85
Germany, a commemoration day against racism149 (9 November 1938), the Minority
Rights Group - Greece and Greek Helsinki Monitor stated that the question by the
anti-Semite MP Georgos Karatzaferis in November 2000 to Prime Minister Costas
Simitis was the proof for present anti-Semitic sentiments in the Parliament.
Karatzaferis asked the Prime Minister to publicly disclose if his daughter married in
a synagogue according to Jewish rituals and, if so, why it happened in secret.
Karatzaferis went on to argue that “when the father of the bride happens to be the
Prime Minister and the wedding ceremony coincides with a period when the
Orthodox Greek is feeling that his faith is being persecuted by governmental actions,
this raises questions that must be examined”, evidently disturbed by the concurrent
identity cards issue in Greece at the time. It has been argued that the question did
receive almost no condemnation, including the Central Board of Jewish
Communities of Greece, characterizing the subliminal nature of anti-Semitism
among Greek populace according to Goldberg, one which has “subtly and
profoundly” permeated the psyche of Greeks to such an extent that even the most
enlightened would not recognize.150
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Last but not least, the Catholic Christians’ complaints are among those who claim
that the Church and the State discriminate them against Orthodox Greeks and the
Catholic Church is seen as “foreign domination” lacking “legality”.151
It is seen that the Greek treatment of minorities do reflect a multitude of policies and
practices, yet it would be recognized that this variety stems from the constant fashion
of viewing minorities as elaborated; therefore, the result respresents itself in uniform
pattern(s). Assimilation, expulsion and denial of ethnic identity/existence stand as
the common practices for Greece, yet still, they appear to be exacerbated by a couple
of factors present in contemporary Greek societal structure, which would help
formulating a general analytical evaluation of the matter in the final section.
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   CHAPTER IV
              ANALYTICAL EVALUATION OF GREECE’S
                         MINORITY-RELATED POLICIES
Provided in length in the previous section, Greek minority policies may lead us to
recognize, as Kuzio posits, that Greece in fact does not fall into the group of western
European states defined as “civic”, as it does not provide polyethnic rights, like
France, but unlike Spain, for instance1. Much of what relates to ‘civic’ state is seen
to be framed around the idea of granting all the citizenship rights regardless of
ethnicity; a liberal democracy whereby ethnicity is not a factor in states’ policies,
one which recognizes individual rights.2 It might also be argued that the ‘ethnic’ and
nationalising states of post-communism might not be the only states in their
vicinities in Europe, as the record seems to be mixed on the question as
abovementioned; rendering Greece an ‘ethnic’ state, although accepted Western. On
the other hand, it can be posited, that perhaps the content and the definition of civic
state might require reconsideration or even reformulation; since there exist many
civic states that pursue varying degrees of homogenizing policies; just as the case in
Greece. One might infer that a clearly defined theoretical framework on the issue still
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remains to be reformulated,3 as civic states of Western Europe see in them occasional
ups in nationalistic tendencies; as the most recent elections in France showed
inclination toward that direction.
Deemed as belonging to the West by Europe itself, Greece in fact does not display
traits of “Westernness” in the assumed sense when it comes to its national minority
issues owing to the reasons cited in the previous section. Yet still, at least two more
elements contributing to the exacerbation of classic Greek perception of minorities
might necessitate attention to better comprehend the analysis of the issue at hand:
media and civil society in Greece.
4. 1  THE GREEK MEDIA: BREEDING HATRED?
The coverage of minority issues by Greek media has been traced as “providing
(dis)information based on one and only source; the corresponding specialized
agencies”; in specific terms, appearing mostly on the newspapers of largest
circulation in Greece; the conservative daily Kathimerini, liberal weekly To Vima,
liberal daily Ta Nea, weekly Economicos Tachydromos have been reported as
engaging in “hate speech” against minorities.4
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Dimitras exemplifies that, on January 1992, Kathimerini wrote there were 250,000
“pure Greeks” living in the area of Skopje; while Economicos Tachydromos, on 1
July 1993, engaged in a character slandering campaign against Greek anthropologist
Tasoula Karakasidou renowned for her studies on Macedonians in Greece, claiming
she had sided with enemy; on the other hand; Ta Nea, on 27 January 1995, accused
Agence France Presse - Athens bureau chief Alain Navarro for having depicted “an
alleged anti-Semitic climate which prevails in Greece”.5  Dimitras further notes that
almost no intellectual or politician showed reaction to such hate speech in the media,
which had more repeated examples. 6
The Greek media has been criticized for being interested in misinforming, and not in
accurate informing of their readership, leading in turn to deception; although the
government in late 1990s repeatedly claimed it was inclined to implement a
pragmatic foreign policy, which proved unhelped by Greek media.
In line with this, when annual State Department Human Rights Report was released
on 30 January 1998, Ta Nea headline read “They even discovered a Slav-speaking
minority in Greece” on the following day; while liberal Exousia wrote “False step by
the US State Department report” 7. Also, on 18-19 February 1998, Eleftherotypia’s
Thessaloniki correspondent wrote that MP status of Galip Galip (of  PASOK) and of
Birol Akifoðlu (of Nea Demokratia) should be abolished as they dared declare they
represented Turkish minority; an idea which came to be embraced by conservative
daily Eleftheros Typos on 19 February 1998 and by overtly “racist, fascist and
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ultranationalist” weekly Shotos on 18 February 1998; displaying a shared affirmation
on the issue, regardless of their political ideologies.8 Similar thoughts were flawed in
the same year in mid-February when famous Greek singer Stelios Kazantzidis
attempted to discredit an equally famous composer, Christos Nikolopoulos, by means
of anti-Semitic accusations, claiming him “agent of Jews”; the pursuant classic
silence of intellectuals, media and journalists led composer Mikis Theodorakis to
increase his voice and argue that racism of zombis was a disgrace for Greece and
“silence was guilt”.9 However, it was Theodorakis this time who was acutely
condemned; Eleftherotypia’s headline on 16 February 1998 read “Theodorakis for
Jews”.
A parallel confirmation in collective sense is observed on Kathimerini’s editorial of
8 August 2001, wherein it is supported that the question of minorities had acquired
particular force in the Balkans, a fact which should place the Greek government “on
alert”; if Athens is to avoid unpleasant surprises; without specifying what such
surprises might be.10 Dimitras maintains11  that the Greek public culture is “anti-
Semitic, racist, extreme nationalist and xenophobic” and that this intolerance
generates from tolerance of hate speech in media against “others”, which most
probably would lead to massive protests in an other European country.
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Last but not least, it can be safely posited that apart from the general state and army
composition, the nationalism-fueling factions in Greece, specifically the media, is
consistent with the education system that teaches to oppose the “other”; putting the
society in a position short of reflexes to react; and media clearly acts as a platform of
indifference at best and xenophobic rhetoric at worst in Greece, feeding mutually
politics, Church, intellectual domain, army, education system and other related
circles; leaving Greeks to perceive minority demands as a threat to the Greek state,
which in fact is occasionally traced as in the words of Foreign Minister Georgos
Papandreou:
There is clearly racism in our country as well. Yet, the causes for
Greece possibly differ from those in neighboring countries. There is
racism which springs from the acquaintance with the other and racism
which is the result of taboos and prejudices without direct contact with
the different.12
It can thus be seen that a top-stratum figure in the state structure confirming racism
in the country, the media has but to back it, as it is supposed to correspond to
whatever officially stated: the sign of an unstrengthened democracy and infant civil
society.
4.  2  CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN GREECE
With the term “civil society” is meant the collection of all institutions and
associations that have no affiliation with the government, one which is capable of
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questioning government practices. However, the idea of nationalism is mutually
served and consolidated between state factions, the Church and the society itself in
Greece, rendering these elements too powerful and solid to be contested by the
society.13
One related recent upheaval, as touched upon in the previous section, was observed
in the civil identity cards issue, when Archbishop Christodoulos in one of his
speeches stated that those supportive of separation of the state and the Church did
not deserve their Greek name and identity.14 Taking it further, he labeled them
“Greeklings”.15
Any overt disagreement with the widely shared national identity consciousness in
Greece is potent to cause a sentiment of diverting from what is shared by the society
at large and a due fear of exclusion. This in turn is manifest as a weak democracy as
Papanikolatos affirms, with “eloquent silence” of intellectuals, and in the recent
reaction of the Greece to the appeal on minority rights on the day Greece celebrated
the 25th anniversary of restoration of democracy Greece in 1999; on its Silver
Jubilee.16
Papanikolatos further argues that the constant excessive doses of hypernationalism
makes Greeks feel insecure when there are no reasons to and that another
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www.aimpress.org.  This day refers to the restoration of Greek democracy which took place in 1974,
when Turkey landed troops on Cyprus and the Junta regime collapsed.
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opportunity was lost on that symbolic celebration day, to show Greek democracy had
eventually grown mature17; a view shared also by Goussetis, leading to the
assumption that Greek democracy, just as Greek civil society, is still infant and
remains to be seen if it will finally ripen18. Pessimistic as it might sound, given the
uncontested nature of state and Church, along with other effective institutions; it is
seen that state and societal impetuses operate to the detriment of democracy in
Greece, which seemingly are in consensus on minority issues; a consensus on
recycling the elements of nationalism19, arguments of homogeneity, in summary, a
common anti-minority attitude in general.
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 CONCLUSION
       PROSPECT  FOR  GREECE  IN  THE  EU:
              DISCORD OR  CONVERGENCE?
It seems highly unlikely that Greece is bound to replace its deep-rooted tradition of
national identity with a European one; accordingly, the driving force behind such
opposition appears to be the age-old enshrined need to ensure continued preservation
of national uniqueness - one which has come to be assumed by Greeks as granted to
them to set a model before others to be civilized as elaborated throughout the 2nd
section. However, such self-esteem attributes seem remote to present-day realities; as
Greece is accepted as part of an entity called the European Union, with
supranational, transnational, and intergovernmental traits, which entail different and
simultaneous types of belonging.
Fossum argues1 in prospect that the EU in future might see four different directions
in integration process; the first is a supranational EU based on federal norms and
rights which rather reflects the current portrait; the second is an EU as a collection of
national cultural communities; the third is an intergovernmental EU as collection of
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democratic (rights-oriented) member-states and; the fourth is an EU marked by ‘deep
diversity’ rather than coherence, grounded on nationalist claims.
Of  these, it might be posited that Greece would take its place in the fourth scenario.
The main reason behind this is the failure of Greece to disclose a member-state
portrait that acts in accordance with “the plurality of ways of belonging”2 to this
complex  polity and sustain a multitude of attachments, more specifically, the way
Greece handles the issues of more technical peculiarity might reflect quite
convergent results on its end; however, this would ask for due accord on a wider
range of more political matters such as minorities, too, as a requirement of
integration philosophy. The argument that the EU is currently rather too technocratic
and/or practical to take constructive steps on the matter is another topic on its own
right; yet still, it can be assumed that it has sufficient instruments and potential to be
effective on its members.
Conversely, from an optimistic perspective, the Greek dilemma in the EU might be
reconciled, should Greece embark in a period of compensation of its democratic
deficits and denounces classic rhetoric of sacred national identity arguments.
Notwithstanding its current political framework which ultimately trades in strong
nationalist ideology; such a positive thinking might lead to an expectancy that future
generations in Greece’s politics might replace the current stands with democratic
involvement which depends largely on social learning that would eventually provide
positive modifications on the minorities’ end.
                                                
2 Ibid.
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         APPENDICES
           APPENDIX A*
   FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
 NATIONAL MINORITIES
                                             (Strasbourg, 1.2.1995)
 (The first relevant eighteen articles)
SECTION 1
Article 1
The protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons
belonging to those minorities forms an integral part of the international protection of
human rights, and as such falls within the scope of international cooperation.
Article 2
The provisions of this framework Convention shall be applied in good faith, in a
spirit of understanding and tolerance and in conformity with the principles of good
neighborliness, friendly relations and cooperation between States.
Article 3
1.  Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose
to be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result from the
exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice.
2.  Persons belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the
freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in he present framework
Convention individually as well as in community with others.
SECTION 2
Article 4
1.  The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities the
right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law. In this respect,
any discrimination based on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited.
2.  The Parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order to
promote, an all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and
effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority and those
belonging to the majority. In this respect, they shall take due account of the
specific conditions of the persons belonging to national minorities.
3.  The measures adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 shall not be considered to
be an act of discrimination.
Article 5
                                                
* Available on http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/157.htm.
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1.  The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging
to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the
essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and
cultural heritage.
2.  Without prejudice to measures taken in pursuance of their general integration
policy, the Parties shall refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of
persons belonging to national minorities against their will and shall protect these
persons from any action aimed at such assimilation.
Article 6
1.  The Parties shall encourage a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue and
take effective measures to promote mutual respect and understanding and
cooperation among all persons living on their territory, irrespective of those
persons’ ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, in particular in the fields
of education, culture and the media.
2.  The Parties undertake to take appropriate measures to protect persons who may be
subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their
ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity.
Article 7
The Parties shall ensure respect for the right of every person belonging to a national
minority to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of
expression, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
Article 8
The Parties undertake to recognize that every person belonging to a national minority
has the right to manifest his or her religion or belief and to establish religious
institutions, organizations and associations.
Article 9
1.  The Parties undertake to recognize that the right to freedom of expression of every
person belonging to a national minority includes freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas in the minority language, without
interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers. The Parties shall
ensure, within the framework of their legal systems, that persons belonging to a
national minority are not discriminated against in their access to the media.
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not prevent Parties from requiring the licensing, without
discrimination and based on objective criteria, of sound radio and television
broadcasting, or cinema enterprises.
3.  The Parties shall not hinder creation and the use of printed media by persons
belonging to national minorities. In the legal framework of sound  radio and
television broadcasting, they shall ensure, as far as possible, and taking into
account the provisions of paragraph 1, that persons belonging to national
minorities are granted the possibility of creating and using their own media.
4.  In the framework of their legal systems, the Parties shall adopt adequate measures
in order to facilitate access to the media for persons belonging to national
minorities and in order to promote tolerance and permit cultural pluralism.
Article 10
1.  The Parties undertake to recognize that every person belonging to a national
minority has the right to use freely and without interference his or her minority
language, in private and in public, orally and in writing.
2.  In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in
substantial numbers, if those persons so request and where such a request
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corresponds to a real need, the Parties shall endeavor to ensure, as far as possible,
the conditions which would make it possible to use the minority language in
relations between those persons and the administrative authorities.
3.  The Parties undertake to guarantee the right of every person belonging to a
national minority to be informed promptly, in a language which he or she
understands, of the reasons for his or her arrest, and of the nature and cause of any
accusation against him or her, and to defend himself or herself in this language, if
necessary with free assistance of an interpreter.
Article 11
1.  The Parties undertake to recognize that every person belonging to a national
minority has the right to use his or her surname (patronym) and first names in the
minority language and the right to official recognition of them, according to
modalities provided for in their legal system.
2.  The Parties undertake to recognize that every person belonging to a national
minority has the right to display in his or her minority language signs, inscriptions
and other information of a private nature visible to the public.
3.  In areas traditionally inhabited by substantial numbers of persons belonging to a
national minority, the Parties shall endeavor, in the framework of their legal
system, including, where appropriate, agreements with other States, and taking
into account their specific conditions, to display traditional local names, street
names and other topographical indications intended for public also in the minority
language when there is a sufficient demand for such indications.
Article 12
1.  The Parties shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields of education and
research to foster knowledge of the culture, history, language and religion of their
national minorities and of the majority.
2.  In this context the Parties shall inter alia provide adequate opportunities for
teacher training and access to textbooks, and facilitate contacts among students
and teachers of different communities.
3.  The Parties undertake to promote equal opportunities for access to education at al
levels for persons belonging national minorities.
Article 13
1.  Within the framework of their education systems, the Parties shall recognize that
persons belonging to a national minority have the right to set up and to manage
their own private educational and training establishments.
2.  The exercise of this right shall not entail any financial obligation for the Parties.
Article 14
1.  The Parties undertake to recognize that every person belonging to a national
minority has the right to learn his or her minority language.
2.  In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in
substantial numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavor to
ensure, as far as possible and within the framework of their education systems,
that persons belonging to those minorities have adequate opportunities for being
taught the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language.
3.  Paragraph 2 of this article shall be implemented without prejudice to the learning
of the official language or the teaching in this language.
Article 15
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The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of
persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in
public affairs, in particular those affecting them.
Article 16
The Parties shall refrain from measures which alter the proportions of the population
in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities and are aimed at
restricting the rights and freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the
present framework Convention.
Article 17
1.  The Parties undertake not to interfere with the right persons belonging to national
minorities o establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts across frontiers
with persons lawfully staying in other States, in particular those with whom they
share an ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, or a common cultural
heritage.
2.  The Parties undertake not to interfere with the right of persons belonging to
national minorities to participate in the activities of non-governmental
organizations both at the national and international levels.
Article 18
1.  The Parties shall endeavor to conclude, where necessary, bilateral and multilateral
agreements with other States, in particular neighboring States, order to ensure the
protection of persons belonging to national minorities concerned.
2.  Where relevant, the Parties shall take measures to encourage transfrontier
cooperation.
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   APPENDIX B*
  TREATY OF LAUSANNE
             (Articles 37-45)
SECTION 3 - PROTECTION OF MINORITIES
Article 37
Turkey undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be
recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action
shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation nor
official action prevail over them.
Article 38
The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life
and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality,
language, race or religion.
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or
private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall no be
incompatible with public order and good morals.
Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and emigration,
subject to the measure applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish
nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defense,
or for the maintenance of public order.
Article 39
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and
political rights as Moslems.
All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before
law.
Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national
in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance,
admission to public employments, functions and honors, or the exercise of
professions and industries.
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any
language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in
publications of any kind or at public meetings.
Notwithstanding the exercise of he official language, adequate facilities shall be
given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own
language before the Courts.
Article 40
                                                
* Lois Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece (New York: Human Rights Watch,
1990), pp. 47-50.
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Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same
treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular,
they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense,
any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments
for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise
their own religion freely therein.
Article 41
As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and
districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident,
adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be
given to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own
language. This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the
teaching of the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools.
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals
belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable
share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of
public funds under the State, municipal, or other budgets for educational, religious or
charitable purposes.
The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the
establishments and institutions concerned.
Article 42
The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in
so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the
settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities.
These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of
representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the
minorities concerned in equal number. In case divergence, the Turkish Government
and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire
chosen from amongst European lawyers.
The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches,
synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned
minorities. All facilities and authorization will be granted to the pious foundations,
and to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present
existing in Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of
new religious and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are
guaranteed to other private institutions of that nature
Article 43
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to
perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith and or religious
observances, and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to
attend Courts of Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest.
This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such
obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservations
of public order.
Article 44
Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-
Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international
concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall
not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of he League of
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Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold
their assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by
a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.
Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have
the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction
of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and
give such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.
Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact
arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the
other Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League
of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14
of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents
that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the
Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall
be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under 13 of the
Covenant.
Article 45
The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem
minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority
in her territory.
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   APPENDIX C*
    TWO EMERGENCY ORDERS BY THE GENERAL
                        ADMINISTRATOR OF THRACE
1) Translation
Kingdom of Greece
General Administration of Thrace
Interior Office
Number of Protocol A1043
Komotene, 27/12/1954
URGENT
TO: The Mayors and Presidents of the Communes of the Prefecture of Rhodope.
Following the order of the President the Government (Prime Minister) we ask you
that from now on and in all occasions the terms “Turk - Turkish” are used instead of
the terms “Muslim - of Muslim”.
The General Administrator of Thrace
G. Fessopoulos
2)  Translation
Kingdom of Greece
General Administration of Thrace
Interior Office
Number of Protocol A202
Komotene, 5/2/1955
In spite of the strict orders of the government to replace the terms “Muslim - of
Muslim” and use from now on the term “Turk - Turkish”, in the village of Aratos on
the public road connecting Komotene and Alexandroupole there exists a very
prominent sign with the words “Muslim School”.
It, as well as any other such signs that might exist in the area of the Prefecture of
Rhodope, should be replaced immediately.
The General Administrator of Thrace
G. Fessopoulos
                                                
* Lois Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece (New York: Human Rights Watch,
1990), pp. 51-52. See ibid. for the Greek and Turkish versions of both documents.
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APPENDIX D*
      REPLY BY THE OFFICE OF TOWN-PLANNING OF THE
          PREFECTURE OF RHODOPE TO THE MANAGING
  COMMITTEE OF THE MUSLIM TEMPLE IN THE VILLAGE
                                        OF SEMBOLA
Translation
         Komotene, 4/2/1985
The Hellenic Republic  Number of Protocol (not
legible)
Prefecture of Rhodope
Office: Office of Town-Planning and Town-Planning Projects
Post Office
Address: Administration Office
Information: Office of Permit Approvals
Telephone: 26582/381 ext.
To: Mr. Omer Hotza Raef
     President of the Managing Committee of the Muslim Temple in the village of
Sembola,
Sembola
Also sent to: Athansios Koures, Civil Engineer, 7 Heroon Ave., Komotene
Re: The return of the planning file regarding restoration of the Muslim Temple in
Sembola. In relation to our letter with number of protocol 94755/??/14-9-1984.
Following up on the aforementioned letter with which we informed you of the
deficiencies present in the planning file for the approval of the required permit, and
given the application, under the same number, that you submitted presenting only the
topographic diagram of the building plot, photographs and the form required by the
statute 105/69, we return to you the file because even though a period of more than
four (4) months has elapsed since our notification on that matter you failed to show
the appropriate interest in completing the planning file with the necessary
documents.
We also inform you that in the case you wish to reapply for the permit approval for
the restoration of the Temple in Sembola the plan would have to be compiled
according to the specifications of the Presidential Decree 3/9/1983 (FEK 394 D/8-9-
83) and you must submit beyond the other documents also a) a detailed diagram of
the building-plot and the nearby area b) detailed budget of the works according to
ATOE c) titles of the property and recent titles of ownership and d) approval of the
Holy Cathedral of Maronea - Komotene.
Enclosed: File to be returned.  Person in Charge: Stelios Matanas
(Architect 4)
                                                
* Lois Whitman, Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece (New York: Human Rights Watch,
1990), pp. 55 and 56. See ibid. for the original Greek version of the letter.
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  APPENDIX E*
A SELECTIVE LIST OF LANDS AND CEMETERIES
      EXPROPRIATED BY GREECE
IN XANTHI
1-  Esma Haným barracks;
In 193671937, 40 acres of land, which was part of a 400 acres, was given to a Greek
named Pandelakis, and later in 1950 the rest, 360 acres was possessed by Greeks
without any notification and payment and distributed to the Greek peasants of
Diomidia, Hamitli and Petinos - Horozlu to be used as fields.
2-  Kelhasanaða Barracks;
In 1950 Greek Government expropriated this land without any warning or payment
and distributed among Greeks of Hamitli and Horozlu villages.
3-  Hamitli Barracks;
2500 acres of land on the west of the railway, half of the 5000 acres barrack land
which belonged to 44 people on 15 deeds, has been passed on to the Greek
government by the decision of a mixed exchange commission. These places have
been given to the villagers of Lefki - Bekirli and Orman Mahalle in order to use land
as fields.
4- Horozlular Barracks;
Belonged to 30 people, taken by Greeks in 1950.
5- In Koca Orman Narastanlý location 1500 acres of barrack land, field and forest
belonging to Mustafa Paþazade Ali Bey.
6- In Koca Orman Narastanlý location 1500 acres of barrack land field and forest
belonging to Mehmet Bey Eminaða zade.
7- In Koca Orman Narastanlý region 3000 acres of barrack land, field and forest
belonging to Demir Süleyman Aðaoðlu Ali Aða.
8- 3000 acres of land which was originally left out of the mixed exchange
commission decision to pass on to the Greek government, half of which situated by
the sea, although belonged to the peasants of Yenice  Taþlýk Turkish village, are
given to the Greeks.
9- 70 acres of land bought by the peasants of Yenice Boyacýlar Turkish village in
1918-1920 from Koyunköylü Bugar Andoln and had the deed made out to three of
them was passed on to the Greek government without any payments.
10- Since 1930 and during the following years, the maps drawn by Greeks show the
deeded Turkish land as “meadows” and from 1945 the field belonging to the Turks
have been gradually taken out of their possession without any notification or
payment, the examples of there are in Feloni -Musfaklý, Koruköy, etc.
                                                
* How The Western Thrace Turks Are Annihilated ( Batý Trakya Türkleri Dayanýþma Derneði,
1976), pp. 14-18.
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11- People who have been falsely accused of cooperating with the Bulgarians and
Germans during 1941-1944 had their lands taken by the Greek government. The
examples of these are in Kumçiftliði or Neo-Orestiasta 5000 acres land of Uskanlý
farm which belonged to the heir of Mustafa Neyir.
12-  In Dimetoka 20,000 acres of forest which belonged to contractor Yakup
Efendi’s son, Hüseyin Efendi was taken by the Greek government.
13- In Ehinos - Þahin region, 30,000 acres of forest land which belonged to Hacý
Deli Hasan Hüseyin was taken out of possession in the same way.
14- In Memkova 15,000 acres of forest belonged to Saitoðullarý was taken by force
of Greek government.
15- 1000 acres of land which belonged to 32 peasants from Vafeyla-Boyacýlar
Turkish village have been taken by the Greek authorities in 1963 without any
notification or payment and later distributed to the Greek peasants of the same
village.
      For the ownership of this land a legal case was won by the possessors, in the first
court of Xanthi, before WW II.
16- In Noyabaþý 1523 pieces of farming land have been taken from the Turks on the
8 September 1955.
17-  In the Ferezler region 89 acres of land was taken away from the Turks.
IN KOMOTINI
1- In Iasmos - Yassiköy region forest, field and barracks land a total of 65000 acres
belonging to the farm of Balabanköy - Dialimli together with 1000 acres of Kuruçay
meadow, was taken by force in 1946 by the Greeks.
2- Later in 1952, these places were distributed to the Greeks. Land taken from the
Turks by special law numbered 2185 in 1952.
3- In Pagurion - Bayatlý region 1337 acres of land belonging to the Büyük Kaval
farm was taken by the Greeks, and only a piece of 315 acres was left to the owners.
4-  From the same farm 2000 acres were taken without paying any compensation.
The Expropriated Turkish Farms in Komotini
5-  Ýmaret farm:  30,000 acres
6-  Murhan farm: 30,000 acres
7-  Çuhacýlar farm: 3,000 acres
8-  Songurlu farm: 5,000 acres
9-  Rumbeyli farm: 5,000 acres
10-  Kýrçiftliði farm: 20,000 acres
11-  Kurtova farm: 22,000 acres
12-  Küçükkaval farm: 12,000 acres
13-  Büyükkaval farm: 18,000 acres
14-  Anaköy farm: 30,000 acres
15-  Yassýada farm: 3,000 acres
16-  Kaþýkçý farm: 1,500 acres
17-  Cambaz farm: 30,000 acres
18-  Otmanlý farm: 15,000 acres
19-  Þýrlaðan farm: 6,000 acres
20-  Yaygýn farm: 3,000 acres
21-  Yardýmlý farm: 5,000 acres
22-  Delnazköy farm: 3,000 acres.
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CEMETERIES
IN XANTHI
Central Cemetery was expropriated by the government to build parks, market place
and shops for the municipality.
Little Cemetery was turned into a park. Central Cemetery of Musfaklý and those of
Okçular near the railway are turned into fields.
IN KOMOTINI
Namazgah Cemetery which covered 40 acres was taken by force, and a public park
was built on the land with a dance floor and church in it.
Yedi Çaplý Cemetery covering 15 acres of land was taken by force to build
municipality facilities.
Dedeler Karaaðacý Cemetery of 50 acres was taken by force and a Christian high
school was built on the land.
Postuboþ Cemetery covering 50 acres was taken by force and on its place public
stables were built.
Martyri Cemetery of 12 acres was turned into a park.
Çarþý Cemetery of 15 acres was destroyed to build banks ans stock exchange
markets on it.
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Web site of The Voice of Turks; www.turkses.com
Web site of US Department of State; www.state.gov
Web site of Hellenic Resources Network; www.hri.org
Web site of Johns Hopkins University; www.jhu.edu
Web site of “Turkish Greek Relations, Disputes and Comments”; www.turk-
yunan.gen.tr
Web site of Central Asia - Caucasus News; www.eurasianet.org
Web site of “Antisemitism and Xenophobia Today”; www.axt.org.uk
Web site of Albanians in Macedonia Crisis Center; www.alb-net.com
Web site of Kathimerini; www.ekathimerini.com
Web site of Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of Nation-State (ARENA
Working Papers); www.arena. uio.no
